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GETTING PAST POSSESSION:  
SUBSURFACE PROPERTY DISPUTES AS NUISANCES 
Joseph A. Schremmer* 
Abstract: Property rights in the subsurface of land are adapting to accommodate modern 
activities like massive hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Property rights will need to continue 
adapting if they are going to accommodate other developing activities like large-scale carbon 
capture and storage (CCS). Courts and commentators rarely approach the nature of subsurface 
property directly. They tend instead to discuss appropriate standards for tort liability when 
disputes arise—for example when artificial fissures from a frac treatment extend into and drain 
oil or gas from a neighbor’s land. The case law and literature generally approach unauthorized 
subterranean invasions as trespasses. Because the tort of trespass is designed to protect 
possession, its application indicates a view of subsurface property as possessory (or 
corporeal)  in nature. 
Despite calling subsurface invasions “trespasses,” courts rarely impose liability for, or 
enjoin, invasions themselves. They instead find liability only for interferences with existing or 
foreseeable uses of the affected land. Leading scholars likewise advocate for a standard of 
subsurface “trespass” that would privilege encroachments that are societally valuable, and 
award compensation only for resulting harm to existing uses of the property. The cases and 
literature thus nominally apply trespass but modify the tort from a property rule into a liability 
rule resembling the tort of nuisance. 
This Article is the first to examine unauthorized subsurface encroachments as nuisances, 
rather than trespasses, and to assert that such encroachments do not implicate possession. 
Drawing on geology, doctrine, and property theory, this Article interrogates the assumption 
that subsurface property is possessory. It analyzes prominent subsurface “trespass” cases 
involving waste disposal, enhanced oil recovery, fracking, natural gas storage, slant-hole wells, 
tunneling, and horizontal drilling to demonstrate that these disputes are already being resolved 
under nuisance-like principles. It argues that express application of nuisance law is doctrinally 
correct and would improve courts’ reasoning, harmonize disparate results, and more efficiently 
allocate costs of subsurface activities. The Article then discusses how viewing subsurface 
invasions as nuisances would remove legal barriers to implementation of new and emerging 
climate change mitigating technologies that utilize subsurface pore space, such as CCS. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons deposited within geologic reservoirs 
have long been scarce and valuable, and ownership rights in them are 
generally well defined.1 The subsurface rock structure and interstitial pore 
                                                   
1. Ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals is defined by the rule of capture. Subject to certain 
common law and statutory exceptions, under the rule of capture ownership of oil and gas vests in the 
owner of the producing well regardless of where the oil or gas migrated from. See JOHN S. LOWE ET 
AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 56–116 (7th ed. 2018) (discussing ownership of 
minerals and the rule of capture); PATRICK H. MARTIN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS: THE LAW OF 
OIL & GAS 17–75 (10th ed. 2016) (describing mineral ownership theories and the rule of capture); 
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space in which hydrocarbons and connate fluids are deposited, on the 
other hand, have been less economically valuable. Property interests in 
the physical structure and pore space, accordingly, have not been clearly 
defined.2 Meanwhile, advancements in technology are enabling greater, 
more extensive uses of the subsurface structure and pore space itself. 
These include activities associated with energy and natural resources 
production, energy storage, and climate change mitigation through carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and other emerging techniques.3 As geologic 
reservoir space becomes ever more useful, it is increasingly necessary to 
develop a clear regime of property rights to specify how subsurface 
owners may act within the reservoir and who may be benefitted and 
harmed by reservoir activities.4 
Defining ownership of subsurface property is a precondition to defining 
tort duties relating to the property.5 Determining which tort applies when 
property is harmed depends on the specific property interest that is 
injured. Where the right of exclusive possession is injured, the applicable 
tort is trespass.6 By comparison, where the right of reasonable use and 
enjoyment is injured, the tort is nuisance. Analyzing how courts apply tort 
doctrine in subsurface property disputes reveals the nature of property 
interests in subsurface reservoir space.7 
Proceeding from the implicit assumption that an interest in subsurface 
property is fully possessory, courts often call subsurface intrusions 
“trespasses.” Yet courts rarely enjoin subsurface intrusions, and they 
generally determine liability for damages by balancing the social value of 
the actor’s conduct against the gravity of harm to the complaining owner’s 
                                                   
Jack C. Hazlewood, Oil and Gas—Protection of Adjoining Landowners—Drainage in Violation of 
Spacing Rules—Loeffler v. King, 29 TEX. L. REV. 111, 111 (1950) (discussing limitations placed on 
the rule of capture by conservation laws). 
2. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 354–59 (1967) (hypothesizing the emergence of property rights in scarce 
resources as a function of their increasing value). 
3. See infra section I.B.  
4. See id. (discussing property rights primarily as a means of allocating the beneficial and harmful 
effects of development of the resource); see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil & Gas 
Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1543, 1575–76 (2014) (explaining how the definition of subsurface 
property rights affects private bargaining among rights holders for use of the subsurface property). 
5. Mark D. Christiansen & David E. Pierce, “When the Horizontal and Vertical Collide: Frac Hits 
and Operator Quest for Détente in the Common Reservoir,” 61 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-
23 (2015).  
6. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939) (defining “nuisance” as a 
nontrespassory invasion of a property interest). 
7. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, & Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972) (presenting a framework of the 
various legal relationships treated by the separate subjects of property and torts).  
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ability to use its property.8 Thus, while courts call subsurface invasions 
“trespasses,” which would entail a property rule, they most frequently 
apply a liability rule resembling the tort of nuisance.9 Like the case law, 
much of the growing subsurface property literature nominally advocates 
for trespass as the tort to protect subsurface property.10 Also like the cases, 
however, the literature tends to modify trespass into a liability rule to 
reach desired results.11 
Professor Owen Anderson’s pathbreaking scholarship is the most 
notable example. Professor Anderson advocates for a modified trespass 
regime that would privilege nonconsensual subsurface intrusions 
whenever they accomplish an important societal need, and would award 
damages to the affected owner only for actual physical harm.12 While 
advocating for a liability rule, however, Professor Anderson expressly 
rejects a scheme based on nuisance law.13 His reasons include the area’s 
historical reputation for being an “impenetrable jungle” and an apparent 
preference for strict liability for resulting damages.14 The rest of the 
literature has generally overlooked nuisance as an alternative. 
This Article analyzes subsurface disputes as nuisances rather than 
trespasses. There are compelling reasons to prefer nuisance over trespass 
as the doctrinal response to subsurface intrusions. For one, as 
demonstrated in detail below, courts’ treatment of subsurface invasions 
                                                   
8. See infra Part IV (reviewing subsurface invasion cases in the contexts of fluid injection, 
enhanced oil and gas recovery, natural gas storage, directional drilling and tunneling, and 
hydraulic  fracturing).  
9. See Calabresi & Malemed, supra note 7, at 1092 (describing a property rule as one that protects 
the holder of an entitlement to injunction against one who wishes to transfer or destroy the entitlement 
and a liability rule as one that provides an entitlement holder damages for the forced transfer or 
destruction of the entitlement). 
10. Scholars have written much about subsurface property rights, primarily in the context of oil and 
gas law. Broader scholarly interest in this area has been spurred recently by the prospect of using 
reservoir pore space for sequestering anthropogenic CO2 and other new technologies intended to 
mitigate climate change. See Tara K. Righetti, Correlative Rights & Limited Common Property in the 
Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass in Carbon Capture & Sequestration, 
47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10420, 10423 nn.33–36 (2017) (collecting scholarship on the 
legal viability of CCS projects with respect to potential trespass liability for transboundary migration 
of sequestered CO2). 
11. See infra section II.B.  
12. Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 247, 247–51 (2010) [hereinafter Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass]; Owen L. 
Anderson, Lord Coke, The Restatement, & Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & 
ENERGY L. 203, 204–07 (2010–2011) [hereinafter Anderson, Lord Coke].  
13. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 12, at 205; Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, 
at 247–48.  
14.  Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 12, at 205; Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 
12, at 247–48 (“Critics may counter that certain types of deep subsurface invasions should not be 
within trespass law at all, but that such invasions should be left to the law of nuisance and negligence. 
I am reluctant to go this far.”).  
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resembles treatment of nuisances, which indicates that the property right 
implicated is use and enjoyment rather than possession.15 Additionally, 
nuisance protects landowners’ interests with a liability rule, which is more 
flexible and context sensitive than a property rule, like trespass. Nuisance 
is thus better able to accommodate the factual complexities inherent in 
subsurface invasions and coordinate conflicting uses of reservoir space.16 
Nuisance also furnishes a wider array of remedies, enabling more efficient 
allocation of the costs of reservoir activities among subsurface owners. 
Even if analyzing subsurface property disputes as nuisances would not 
change the results in many or most cases, doing so would aid the 
coherence and predictability of courts’ decision-making. This is not a 
trivial benefit. As the fledgling deployment of commercial-scale CCS 
illustrates,17 uncertainty in subsurface property rights and liabilities stifles 
investment in, and development of, potentially beneficial technologies. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the physical 
interconnectedness of subsurface property and the resulting potential for 
subsurface use conflicts. Part II examines the doctrinal foundations of the 
prevailing exclusionary, or possession-based, view of subsurface property 
and reviews related literature. Sections III.A and III.B, respectively, 
introduce the history of nuisance law and the version of nuisance adopted 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section III.C theorizes that that an 
ownership interest in pore space is not fully possessory and thus not 
susceptible of trespass. Part IV attempts to confirm this theory by 
examining cases involving fluid injection, enhanced oil and gas recovery, 
natural gas storage, directional drilling and tunneling, and hydraulic 
fracturing. Part IV also demonstrates how these disputes would be 
resolved by expressly applying a nuisance framework. Part IV ends by 
discussing the application of nuisance principles to invasions caused by 
CCS and other emerging climate change mitigation techniques. Part V 
concludes that courts are already engaging in nuisance-like analyses, and 
that doing so expressly would aid the coherence of their decisions and 
                                                   
15. See infra Part IV.  
16. For a discussion of exclusionary schemes, like trespass, versus governance schemes, like 
nuisance, see generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (discussing use in the law of exclusion 
strategies, which place all decisions about use of a resource in a single owner, and governance 
strategies, which impose on a group of duty holders the task of defining and monitoring proper use of 
a common resource); see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion & Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1024–45 (2004) (discussing nuisance’s role in limiting a regime of exclusion 
thusly: “Nuisance rests on a foundation of exclusion, whether this is labeled trespass or nuisance, but 
it also fine-tunes this hard-edged regime where the stakes are high enough and courts have some 
advantage in providing off-the-rack governance rules”).  
17. See infra section I.C (discussing the slow roll out of CCS technology due in part to uncertainty 
in the legal rules governing liability for CO2 migration). 
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reduce one barrier to investment in subsurface technologies: legal 
uncertainty.I. The Subsurface: Reservoir                                Geology and 
Commercial Uses 
A. Reservoir Geology in Brief 
The subsurface of the earth is complex. It is presently understood to 
consist of basically four internal layers—the crust, mantle, outer core, and 
inner core.18 Humans have never penetrated below the crust,19 and it is 
within this layer that we have explored and developed commercial uses of 
the subsurface. The crust consists of layered beds of rock formations with 
differing properties. Like a sponge, the interior of these rock structures 
consists of small, interconnected pathways known as pore spaces.20 These 
pore spaces are voids in the rock that can contain any number of fluid 
substances including air, freshwater, saltwater, and hydrocarbons like oil 
and gas.21 Together the physical structure of the rock and these pore 
spaces make up the crust of the earth. 
A geologic “reservoir” is an interconnected subsurface rock structure 
that is under pressure from the overlying rock.22 As the pressure within 
one portion of a reservoir changes—for example from a penetrating 
wellbore—the pressure will change throughout the reservoir. Changes in 
pressure cause the fluids contained within reservoir pore spaces to move 
through the interconnected pathways toward areas of lower pressure.23 
Fluids flow most freely within rock formations that have high porosity, 
meaning the rock has a high ratio of pore space versus solid space, and 
high permeability, which signifies a high degree of pore space 
interconnectivity.24 Together the properties of porosity and permeability 
determine a formation’s suitability as a reservoir for oil or gas, waste 
disposal, or, as discussed below, CCS.25 
                                                   
18. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 993 (2008).  
19. Id. at 994. 
20. LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
21. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423.  
22. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 8, 21 (defining a “reservoir” and describing the types of 
reservoir drives).  
23. See Sidney J. Strong, Application of the Doctrine of Correlative Rights by the State 
Conservation Agency in the Absence of Express Statutory Authorization, 28 MONT. L. REV. 205, 
passim (1967) (“Unlike solid minerals, oil and gas are fugacious or they tend to migrate from areas 
of high pressure to areas of low pressure.” (citing 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 4 (2d ed. 1954); 
SULLIVAN, OIL AND GAS LAW § 7 (1955))).  
24. Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Geology, The Marcellus Shale, Experts, & Dispute Resolution, 116 W. 
VA. L. REV. 865, 876, 884 (2014).  
25. Id. at 876. 
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B. Commercial Uses of the Subsurface 
Geologic reservoirs have many established and potential commercial 
uses, most of which involve exploitation of hydrocarbons contained 
within the pore space of the physical strata.26 These activities include the 
injection of fluids into subsurface strata for oil and gas production. Some 
of the most common fluid injection activities are hydraulic fracturing,27 
secondary and enhanced recovery,28 and disposal of produced saltwater as 
a byproduct of production.29 When natural gas is produced it is frequently 
stored for later sale or use through injection into subsurface reservoirs. 
Further, under the federal Underground Injection Control (UIC) program, 
hazardous and nonhazardous fluid wastes are injected into relatively deep 
reservoirs for disposal.30 
In addition to these longstanding subsurface activities, new uses for the 
subsurface are emerging. Emerging uses include compressed air energy 
storage (CAES) and underground aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) of 
groundwater.31 CAES is designed to store surplus electricity produced by 
wind power generation to manage the complications imposed by the 
inherent intermittence of wind. CAES diverts electricity that would have 
otherwise been delivered into the electric grid and uses it to compress and 
pump air into deep reservoirs for storage. The air can then be drawn upon 
as needed to operate natural gas turbines more efficiently.32 ASR refers to 
the injection of freshwater into deep reservoirs for later retrieval.33 Other 
                                                   
26. Modern drilling for oil and gas started in earnest in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 12–15 (Free Press 2009). 
With oil and gas drilling came a variety of related underground operations designed to stimulate 
production. One early and dramatic example was detonating nitroglycerin in the bottom of a well. 
See, e.g., People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 59 (Ind. 1892). After World War II oil and gas 
developers began stimulating wells by hydraulically fracturing the productive geologic formations 
through injection of pressurized water, sand, and chemicals in a process known as “hydraulic 
fracturing” or “fracking.” NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, 
EXPLORATION, DRILLING, & PRODUCTION 423–24 (2d ed. 2001). Together with horizontal drilling, 
hydraulic fracturing became a standard means of extracting oil and gas from unconventional, or 
“tight,” shale formations previously uneconomic to produce. Id. 
27. See infra section IV.E.  
28. See infra section IV.B. 
29. See infra section IV.A. 
30. See infra section IV.A.  
31. R. Lee Gresham & Owen L. Anderson, Legal and Commercial Models for Pore-Space Access 
and Use for Geologic CO2 Sequestration, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 706–07 (2011).  
32. Id. (citing Paul Denholm & Ramteen Sioshansi, The Value of Compressed Air Energy Storage 
with Wind in Transmission-Constrained Electric Power Systems, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 3149–50 (2009)).  
33. Id. at 707 (citing Peter J. Kiel & Gregory A. Thomas, Banking Groundwater in California: Who 
Owns the Aquifer Storage Space?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 25, 25 (2003)). ASR is currently 
practiced in certain dry western states including Texas and Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-
9-107.5 (West 2020) (authorizing aquifer storage-and-recovery plans in Colorado); TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. §§ 27.151–.157 (West 2020) (authorizing ASR projects). 
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uses of the storage capacity of geologic reservoirs are certain to 
develop  in the future. 
Currently, the most notable emerging pore space technology—CCS—
is potentially the most significant and likeliest to lead to complications 
with other subsurface activities. CCS emerged as a tool to mitigate climate 
change.34 It has the potential to reduce the rate of climate change by 
capturing and storing, or “sequestering,” anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions into deep subsurface reservoirs for storage on a geologic 
time scale.35 In CCS, “the gas is compressed to a supercritical fluid and 
injected a kilometer or deeper in to the microscopic ‘pore space’ in the 
deep subsurface rock matrix, displacing the in situ brine,” for instance, the 
saltwater naturally in place in the pore space.36 
CCS evolved from technologies developed for oil and gas recovery and 
storage.37 Depleted oil and gas reservoirs are excellent CO2 storage sites 
because they provide adequate pore space capacity and porosity and 
permeability, have already been explored and characterized, and can 
mostly contain the migration of injected CO2.38 Other types of geologic 
formations that are useful for CO2 storage include deep saline reservoirs 
and un-mineable coal seams.39 The United States Department of Energy 
estimates that the United States has the capacity to store at least 2,400 
billion metric tons of man-made CO2.40 This capacity could offset 
centuries’ worth of the country’s total CO2 emissions from large 
stationary sources.41 
                                                   
34. A consensus of scientists has concluded that control of greenhouse gas emissions is necessary 
to avoid “severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems” and significant negative impacts on 
public health, agriculture, food supply, forests, water resources, and even energy production itself. 
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and Property 
Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368 (2010) (quotations omitted).  
35. MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROY A. PARTAIN, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: EFFICIENT LEGAL 
POLICIES FOR RISK GOVERNANCE AND COMPENSATION 2 (2017). This Article will refer to the process 
as “CCS” for convenience.  
36. Klass & Wilson, supra note 34, at 365; see also Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423 (describing 
pore space as a “split bone”).  
37. FAURE & PARTAIN, supra note 35, at 11.  
38. Id. at 16.  
39. PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION (CCS) 
IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44902.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9CM-FFAC].  
40. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE’s Carbon Utilization and Storage Atlas Estimates at Least 2,400 
Billion Metric Tons of U.S. CO2 Storage Resource, OFF. FOSSIL ENERGY (Dec. 19, 2012), 
https://www.energy.gov/fe/articles/does-carbon-utilization-and-storage-atlas-estimates-least-2400 
[https://perma.cc/2QT6-5CMD].  
41. FOLGER, supra note 39, at 8.  
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C. Coordinating Conflicting Uses of a Common Reservoir 
Because reservoirs are interconnected, any activity in one portion of a 
reservoir will to some extent affect the pressure in other parts. By virtue 
of porosity and permeability, fluid that is injected into a reservoir tends to 
migrate away from the injection location toward areas of lower pressure 
and occupy pore spaces in distant parts of the reservoir.42 Subsurface 
activities, like hydraulic fracturing and fluid injection and storage, thus 
directly and indirectly affect large areas of subsurface property and often 
interfere with subsurface activities in other parts of the same reservoir. 
This interconnectedness, Professor David Pierce notes, means that “[e]ach 
oil and gas reservoir comprises a community of owners.”43 Disputes arise 
between members of a reservoir community when one member’s 
activities cause changes in pressure and fluid migration in a portion of the 
reservoir underlying another member’s land. Such subsurface disputes are 
more complex than disputes over the ownership and use of the surface of 
property because the subsurface is geologically complex and 
hidden  from view.44 
The history of CCS illustrates the practical problems that arise from 
interconnectedness of subsurface property. There has not been large-scale 
deployment of existing CCS technology despite abundant potential 
storage sites and favorable legislation.45 Commercial CCS projects are 
rare—but not necessarily because they are commercially infeasible. A 
recently renewed federal tax credit may even make projects economically 
attractive.46 A primary obstacle to large-scale deployment of CCS instead 
appears to be the extent of subsurface area required for a single storage 
facility. This problem arises from the inevitable transboundary migration 
of injected CO2.47 Various studies indicate that injected CO2 sequestered 
                                                   
42. LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 16–18.  
43. David E. Pierce, Resolving Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling Conflicts Using a Reservoir 
Community Analysis, 90 N.D. L. REV. 249, 250 (2014) (citing JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES & 
MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 21 (6th ed. 2013)).  
44. See Christopher S. Kulander & R. Jordan Shaw, Comparing Subsurface Trespass Jurisprudence—
Geophysical Surveying and Hydraulic Fracturing, 46 N.M. L. REV. 67, 67–68 (2016).  
45. See FOLGER, supra note 39, at 1 (noting a number of bills introduced in the 115th Congress 
intended to incentivize implementation of CCS); Klass & Wilson, supra note 34, at 364.  
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 45Q (Supp. 2012) (“Credit for carbon dioxide sequestration.”).  
47. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 91 n.7 (“Requiring project developers to obtain consent from 
all pore-space owners within the migratory path of the CO2 plume could have the practical effect of 
prohibiting many sequestration projects.”); Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423 (“Scholars have 
recognized the issue of transboundary migration and trespass as critical to the practical, legal, and 
economic viability of CCS projects.” (citing James Robert Zadick, The Public Pore Space: Enabling 
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Sequestration by Reconceptualizing Subsurface Property Rights, 36 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. & POL’Y REV. 257, 269 (2011))).  
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in the subsurface could migrate laterally hundreds or thousands of 
square miles.48 
The propensity of injected CO2 to migrate over such large areas creates 
two legal risks that stifle investment in sequestration projects. The first is 
the risk of trespass. Under the doctrine of ad coelum, an owner of real 
property is deemed to own the earth below the property’s surface 
boundaries.49 In much of the United States, land ownership is highly 
subdivided into relatively small, separately owned tracts. Consequently, 
many owners may have rights in a single reservoir and, migrating CO2 
may trespass on the rights of owners far beyond the area acquired for 
injection. The theoretical solution, which is not always practically 
possible, is to obtain such owners’ consent to use their pore space for 
sequestration.50 Second, migrating CO2 may interfere with other 
commercial subsurface activities such as primary and enhanced oil 
recovery, waste disposal, and natural gas storage. Migration is thus likely 
to foment disputes between the CO2 injector and the competing user 
unless the competing user has consented.51 The problem is compounded 
because CO2 sequestration projects are likely to be sited in depleted oil 
and gas reservoirs where preexisting operations for oil and gas recovery 
and waste disposal may be ongoing. 
While these issues may impact CCS projects especially because of the 
size of the subsurface area where sequestered CO2 is likely to migrate, 
they arise on some scale any time the subsurface is used for extracting or 
injecting fluids. The legal uncertainty helping to stifle large-scale 
deployment of CCS illustrates the need for a system of defining and 
ordering the competing interests of subsurface rights holders over vast 
areas. As discussed in the following section, courts and scholars often 
employ a possession-based analysis to resolve competition among 
conflicting subsurface activities. 
                                                   
48. LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 91 n.7 (collecting scholarly studies). One study predicted injected 
CO2 could disperse over 100 square kilometers within the first 30 years of sequestration. Sprankling, 
supra note 18, at 1030.  
49. See infra section II.A.1 (discussing the ad coelum doctrine).  
50. A few states have enacted unitization statutes for consolidating pore space for CCS. E.g., WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-313 to -316 (West 2020).  
51. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 771.  
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II. THE POSSESSION-BASED REGIME OF               
SUBSURFACE OWNERSHIP 
A. The Common Law Background 
1. The Ad Coelum Doctrine 
Discussion of the nature and extent of subsurface ownership starts with 
the ad coelum doctrine. The doctrine derives from the Latin maxim cujus 
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos, which holds that the 
rights of the surface owner extend infinitely upward “to the heavens” and 
downward “to hell” or the center of the earth.52 Ad coelum extends surface 
boundaries downward, theoretically, to the earth’s core. Noting that the 
earth is round, a Louisiana court has pointed out that under ad coelum, “a 
surface tract’s subsurface measurement must necessarily narrow as it 
approaches the center point of the earth. Ownership of subsurface tracts 
equal in size to surface tracts would result in overlapping boundaries as 
the available area diminishes.”53 Thus surface property boundaries are not 
directly indicative of subsurface boundaries. 
Under ad coelum, ownership of the surface of land includes ownership 
of the underlying minerals.54 The owner can sever ownership of oil, gas, 
and other minerals to create two estates, the mineral estate and the surface 
estate, each capable of separate ownership in fee.55 Land titles often 
become complex where the surface and mineral estates are partially or 
completely severed in this manner. Determining title to the mineral estate 
and surface state requires determining title to each component part of the 
subsurface.56 It is generally accepted that the subsurface consists of three 
basic component parts: (1) the physical strata, or the “subsurface mass,”57 
                                                   
52. Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 71; Sprankling, supra note 18, at 982–84. For a thorough 
and persuasive critique of the ad coelum doctrine, see generally Sprankling, supra note 18.  
53. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 959 n.9 (La. 1986). 
54. 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 60-1 (1987) (“Ownership of land 
carries with it ownership of or the exclusive right to enjoy substances under the surface . . . .”); see, 
e.g., De Moss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 485 (La. 1918) (“It need not be restated that the ownership of 
the surface of the earth carries with it the right to the minerals beneath . . . .”).  
55. See e.g., De Moss, 78 So. at 482. (“The elements of ownership in land may be severed. The 
owner may sell surface rights, and except from the sale the minerals below the surface, and reserve 
to himself the right to mine those minerals . . . .”). Courts and scholars quickly understood that ad 
coelum was, “inadequate to solve the problems of a substance under the earth, which would migrate 
to points of lower pressure caused by punctures of the reservoir by drilling,” and eventually adopted 
the rule of capture, the doctrine of correlative rights, and conservation regulation to govern ownership 
of oil and gas in common reservoirs. See Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 962 (La. 
1986) (quoting H. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 415 (1949)). These principles do not 
necessarily apply equally to the rock strata and pore space within which hydrocarbons are found. 
56. Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 68. 
57. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 442 (5th Cir. 2011).  
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that comprises the earth’s structure; (2) the void pore spaces within the 
physical strata; and (3) the fluid substances within the pore spaces.58 
There is little doubt in any jurisdiction that the owner of the surface 
estate owns title to the subsurface mass, and that the mineral estate owner 
owns the hydrocarbon substances within the pore spaces. In many states, 
however, it is not clear which of the two owns the pore space itself. Some 
states have declared by statute that pore space ownership belongs to one 
estate or the other, but even clear legislative intent does not necessarily 
clarify title.59 The majority rule—among both states with a statutory 
declaration and common law states—appears to be that the pore space is 
included in the surface estate unless specifically conveyed (or reserved) 
in a severance of the mineral estate.60 Thus in a majority of jurisdictions 
the surface estate owner is deemed to own fee simple in the physical strata 
and pore space underlying the surface boundaries of her tract to the 
center  of the earth. 
2. Trespass as the Tort Remedy for Injury to Possession 
At common law the fee owner holds the absolute exclusive right to 
possess the land subject to the fee. The United States Supreme Court has 
even said the right to exclude others is “one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”61 
Contemporary scholars have gone further and described the right to 
exclude as the essential element of property.62 The common law remedy 
for enforcing an owner’s exclusive possessory interest in land is the 
tort  of trespass. 
                                                   
58. See Righetti, supra note 10, at 10423–34 (noting the subsurface is like a “split bone—despite 
the calcified and compact exterior, the inside is spongy, or cancellous; between the mesh-like sheets 
and spikes of bone are tiny cavities filled with marrow”). 
59. See id. at 10424 (discussing several nuances affecting title to pore space even in states with a 
clear legislative declaration).  
60. Id. at 10425 (citing Stefanie L. Burt, Who Owns the Right to Store Gas: A Survey of Pore Space 
Ownership  in  U.S.  Jurisdictions,  4  JOULE  DUQ.  ENERGY  &  ENVTL.  L.J.  (2016),  http://www.
duqlawblogs.org/joule/wp-content/  uploads/2016/07/Who-Owns-the-Right-to-Store-Gas-A-Survey-
of-Pore-Space-Ownership-in-U.S.-Jurisdictions-.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)). Certain states, like 
Kansas, have not directly addressed the pore space ownership question but have held that the surface 
estate is entitled to authorize fluid injection, which strongly implies ownership of the pore space. See 
Dick Props., LLC v. Paul H. Bowman Tr., 221 P.3d 618, 618 ¶¶ 1–6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).  
61. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
62. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and The Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998); see 
also Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75 (1985) (stating 
that at common law first possession was the root of title).  
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Modern treatises define trespass as the “wrongful interference with the 
right of exclusive possession of real property.”63 At early common law 
trespass included several different actions, each directed at a different 
kind of wrong. Trespass quare clausum fregit (“breaking a close”) was 
limited to direct physical invasions of exclusive possession. As one early 
twentieth century court explained, “[i]t is, of course, axiomatic that at 
common law the gist of the action of trespass quare clausum fregit is 
injury to the possession, and that, generally speaking, the plaintiff must 
show actual or constructive possession at the time of the trespass.”64 
Contrastingly “indirect and consequential” injuries arising from 
nonphysical invasions were remedied under the writ of trespass on the 
case.65 Trespass on the case was also brought to enforce nonpossessory, 
or incorporeal, property rights like easements and licenses.66 Unlike 
trespass quare clausum fregit, trespass on the case required proof of actual 
injury and did not entitle the plaintiff to ejectment or nominal damages.67 
Claims of nuisance were, under the writ system, brought as claims for 
trespass on the case.68 
The traditional common law remedies for trespass quare clausum fregit 
were designed to enforce the owner’s exclusivity of possession. That 
design is reflected in the modern remedies for trespass: injunctive relief, 
ejectment, restitution, and nominal and compensatory damages.69 
Recovery for trespass quare clausum fregit is allowed without proof of 
damages. Rather “the law infers some damage without proof of actual 
                                                   
63. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 2 (2019) (“The tort of trespass applies to the wrongful interference with 
the right of exclusive possession of real property . . . .”).  
64. Slye v. Guerdrum, 29 App. D.C. 550, 552 (D.C. 1907). 
65. See Sutherland v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 595 P.2d 780, 783 (Okla. 1979) (discussing the 
“ancient subtleties” that characterized the writ system).  
66. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Distinguishing Trespass and Nuisance: A Journey Through a 
Shifting Borderland, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 253 (1991). 
67. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 9–10 (Tex. 2008) (citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 78 (5th ed. 1984)). 
68. Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PENN. L. REV. 631, 652 (1928). 
American courts largely abandoned the common law forms of action and the writ system in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Stephen C. Dillard et al., Nuisance Cases Against Energy Companies 
in Texas, Pennsylvania, and Other Areas with Significant or Developing Oil and Gas Exploration, 59 
S. TEX. L. REV. 447, 450–53 (2018). Yet some jurisdictions still recognize trespass on the case as a 
cause of action for interference with a nonpossessory interest in land. As the Texas Supreme Court 
(which still recognizes an action for trespass on the case by owners of nonpossessory interests) 
reminded the plaintiffs in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., “[a]t common law, trespass 
included several actions directed to different kinds of wrongs. Trespass quare clausum fregit was 
limited to physical invasions of plaintiff’s possessory interest in land; trespass on the case was not.” 
268 S.W.3d at 9 (internal citations omitted).  
69. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10429 (collecting authorities for each remedy).  
 
13 Schremmer.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:44 PM 
328 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:315 
 
injury” from direct invasions of property.70 The inference of damages is 
justified by a variety of policy reasons including “to prevent the 
acquisition of a prescriptive right, to settle a dispute regarding title, to 
vindicate a property right, and because trespass was so likely in early 
times to lead to a breach of the peace.”71 The presumption of damages is 
necessary to protect the owner’s exclusivity of possession, which is 
injured by the mere fact of an unauthorized invasion. Requiring an owner 
to show actual damages to recover for a trespass, on the other hand, 
“‘would place a premium on trespassing’ by ‘mak[ing] the position of the 
trespasser more favorable’” than that of the owner.72 
Common law trespass is subject to few defenses. The primary defense 
for nonnegligent trespasses—necessity—is narrow. Necessity allows 
unauthorized entry when it is reasonably necessary to preserve property 
or life, prevent serious bodily harm to a third person, or escape bodily 
injury.73 Even where the defense applies, the resulting privilege is 
incomplete because the actor remains liable for compensating the property 
owner for actual damages caused by the privileged trespass.74 
Courts’ application of trespass quare clausum fregit has evolved to 
conform to modern realities. For example some states still follow the 
traditional rule (or, sometimes, the “dimensional test”) requiring a direct 
invasion by an object that is visible to the human eye to constitute a 
trespass.75 Many other states, recognizing the lesson of particle physics 
that energy and matter are equal, have rejected the dimensionality test in 
favor of focusing on the type of interest invaded. The leading case 
rejecting the dimensionality test is Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.76 There, 
                                                   
70. 17A CARMODY-WAIT NEW YORK PRACTICE, Nominal Damages in Actions for Trespass to 
Land § 107:137 (2d. ed. 2019) (emphasis added).  
71. Page Keeton & Lee Jones, Jr., Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry II, 39 TEX. L. REV. 
253, 256–57 (1961).  
72. Sakele Bros., LLC v. Safdie, 302 A.D.2d 20, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (quoting De Camp v. 
Bullard, 54 N.E. 26, 28 (N.Y. 1899)). For example, under the traditional view of trespass the owner 
of Blackacre would be entitled to sue his neighbor for nominal damages and ejectment in response to 
her neighbor’s crossing Blackacre as a shortcut to a public street even if Blackacre suffered no harm. 
In fact, the owner of Blackacre would have a legal obligation to sue to prevent the neighbor from 
gaining a prescriptive right in Blackacre. See Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 
GONZ. L. REV. 271, 309–10 (2008). Without an inference of damages enabling Blackacre’s owner to 
sue for ejectment, the neighbor’s trespass would effectively be privileged over the owner’s right of 
exclusive possession, and Blackacre’s owner would have no legal remedy to prevent loss of title by 
prescription or adverse possession. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict 
Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1926) 
(describing the defense of necessity to trespass as an “incomplete privilege”). 
73. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 36 (2019).  
74. Bohlen, supra note 72, at 312–13. 
75. Bortland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979) (citing 1 HARPER & JAMES, 
TORTS § 1.23 (1946)).  
76.  342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (en banc).  
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the Oregon Supreme Court held that intrusion by invisible fluoride 
particles constituted a trespass.77 The court theorized that the “direct” and 
“physical” elements of a traditional common law tort action were merely 
judges’ attempt to describe the types of invasions that interfere with 
possession.78 In discerning the appropriate cause of action as between 
trespass and nuisance in a borderline case, the Martin Court focuses on 
the nature of the interest impacted by the defendant’s conduct instead of 
the physical nature of the intrusion.79 
Trespass and ad coelum also morphed to meet modern needs in the 
form of commercial air travel. In 1946 the United States Supreme Court 
in United States v. Causby80 noted that ad coelum has no place in the 
modern world and held that a landowner has no common law right to stop 
airplane flights high over her property.81 Under Causby and its progeny, 
landowners are entitled to damages for actual injury caused by use of the 
airspace above their land but not to any remedy for the unauthorized entry 
of the property itself.82 The Restatement (Second) of Torts incorporated 
Causby’s conception of airspace trespass.83 Courts continued to label air 
invasions as “trespasses” for decades until eventually coming to view 
“that any liability should be in nuisance and should thus depend on 
whether there was unreasonable and substantial interference with 
the  surface.”84 
While courts were expressly limiting the ad coelum doctrine in the 
context of overlying airspace they were also implicitly limiting its 
application to the underlying subsurface.85 As examined closer below,86 
the advent of modern hydrocarbon production techniques triggered a spate 
of litigation over subsurface interferences. These disputes have resulted 
in a multitude of doctrinally confused, logically inconsistent, result-
oriented decisions.87 A sizeable literature considering the rights and 
                                                   
77. Id. at 797.  
78. Id. at 793.  
79. Id. at 794 (“Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which invades the 
possessor’s protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible 
pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of 
a  physicist.”). 
80. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
81. Id. at 261.  
82. See Reynolds, supra note 66, at 235–36.  
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1969).  
84. Reynolds, supra note 66, at 236–37.  
85. See Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 73; see also infra Part IV.  
86. See infra Part IV.  
87. See, e.g., Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 723 (“However, the case law is neither 
entirely unified nor coherent.”); Sprankling, supra note 18, at 1020 (noting the inconsistency in case 
law dealing with landowners’ rights more than two miles below the surface). 
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remedies of owners of subsurface property interests 
developed  in response. 
B. Subsurface Ownership Literature 
Commentators have advanced multiple models of subsurface property. 
Several commentators urge eliminating any private property rights in the 
deep subsurface and making it a public domain.88 Others would empower 
private actors to employ eminent domain authority to consolidate pore 
space within a common reservoir for specific purposes such as CCS 
projects.89 While approaches like these may be effective in encouraging 
deployment of particular technologies like CCS, they take a piecemeal 
approach to governing use of the subsurface. They would also require 
significant legislation and the creation of new bureaucracies 
for implementation. 
Even where a regulatory regime authorizes the creation of compulsory 
units of property for particular subsurface activities, those units must 
necessarily share boundaries with non-unitized property. And because 
administrative agencies typically lack the authority to adjudicate common 
law causes of action or license private actors to commit torts,90 the 
creation of a unit for any particular purpose may not preclude an action 
by an owner outside of the unit for common law trespass.91 Therefore, 
even where subsurface rights are consolidated administratively, it is 
necessary to determine the extent of the ownership rights of 
nonconsenting owners. 
Other scholars have advanced alternative models of subsurface 
property that could address all kinds of subsurface uses and interferences. 
Two predominant models have emerged—one that views subsurface 
rights within a trespass-based framework and one that focuses instead on 
                                                   
88. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10434 (citing Spranking, supra note 18, at 1032; A. Bryan Endres, 
Geologic Carbon Sequestration: Balancing Efficiency Concerns and Public Interest in Property 
Rights Allocations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 646–49 (2011); Kevin L. Doran & Angela M. Cifor, 
Does the Federal Government Own the Pore Space Under Private Lands in the West?, 42 ENVTL. L. 
527, 545 (2012); Zadick, supra note 47; Will Reisinger et al., Reconciling King Coal and Climate 
Change: A Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 33 
(2009)). Professor Wiseman would not abolish private rights but has suggested the need for public 
intervention in coordination of subsurface rights in the form of “subsurface comprehensive planning 
and zoning.” Wiseman, supra note 4, at 1576.  
89. See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 34, at 425.  
90. See Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 734–35 (noting that “[a]s with title issues, 
regulatory bodies have no general authority to authorize trespasses or other torts,” and citing cases).  
91. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10437 (citing Bruce M. Kramer, Horizontal Drilling and Trespass: 
A Challenge to the Norms of Property and Tort Law, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY & ENVTL. 
L. REV. 291 (2014)).  
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the correlative nature of subsurface property. The following subsections 
will briefly review the two dominant models. 
1. Focusing on Possession: The Subsurface Trespass Model 
A majority of the literature advocates for application of a modified 
approach to subsurface trespass similar to the modern trespass rule 
established in Causby.92 The leading voice in this area is Professor Owen 
Anderson.93 Anderson concludes that “[w]henever the trespasser’s 
subsurface intrusion accomplishes an important societal need, including 
private commercial needs, and so long as the subsurface owner suffers no 
actual and substantial damages, subsurface trespass should not be 
actionable.”94 Under this regime courts may not enjoin subsurface 
intrusions deemed socially desirable that do not cause actual harm.95 
However, where an intrusion causes damage beyond the fact of the 
intrusion to the complaining owner, the trespasser would be strictly liable 
for compensation.96 Anderson states that his approach redefines a fee 
interest in subsurface property so as not to encompass the right to exclude 
socially desirable intrusions. Per Anderson, “property . . . denote[s] legal 
relations between persons with respect to a thing,” and so, “[w]hile the 
right to exclude trespassers is a fundamental incident of property 
ownership, the right, like other incidents, neither is nor should be 
absolute.”97 Stated another way, Anderson’s approach modifies trespass 
from a property rule into a liability rule under which the owner is not 
entitled to injunction to protect its entitlement but instead may only obtain 
compensatory damages for infringement of its entitlement.98 
Aspects of Professor Anderson’s subsurface “trespass” rule closely 
resemble principles of nuisance law, particularly as reflected in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Professor Anderson’s standard, for 
example, would consider the “societal need” for the interfering activity 
and the degree of harm to the complaining party in a sort of “balance of 
utilities” test.99 Yet Anderson expressly rejects nuisance as an analytical 
                                                   
92. See generally, e.g., Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12; Anderson, Lord Coke, 
supra note 12; Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines, Is There an 
Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361 (2014).  
93. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, at 247.  
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 248.  
96. Id.  
97. Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note 12, at 203–04 (internal citations omitted).  
98. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1089.  
99. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, at 248 (citing as an artificial barrier N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 42-02-12 (2009), which immunizes activities expressly authorized by law from being 
nuisances).  
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tool in resolving subsurface-use disputes.100 In support he cites the oft-
quoted passage from Prosser and Keeton on Torts, which describing 
nuisance law as an “impenetrable jungle.”101 He also references certain 
artificial barriers several jurisdictions have raised to nuisance claims. 
The substance of Anderson’s brief critique of nuisance law, however, 
appears to be a preference for a strict liability standard: “[W]hen one 
intentionally injects a substance that physically invades the subsurface of 
a neighboring landowner, money damages should be recoverable for any 
actual and substantial damage caused without having to engage in the 
uncertainty of balancing whether the gravity of harm to the landowner 
outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct.”102 The discussion below 
will evaluate the merits of a strict-liability approach 
like  Professor  Anderson’s.103 
2. Focusing on Correlative Rights: Reservoir Community Analysis 
The alternative model of analyzing disputes over common subsurface 
property is Professor David Pierce’s “reservoir community analysis.”104 
Pierce’s analysis focuses on the physical interconnectedness of common 
reservoirs rather than the artificial legal boundaries separating tracts of 
property at the surface.105 Reservoir community analysis “defines the 
rights and obligations of the owners in the oil and gas reservoir by 
recognizing that the owners coexist in a common environment instead of 
the artificial compartmentalized environment” created under a strict 
application of ad coelum.106 This mode of analysis would resolve 
intrareservoir disputes, like intrusions from hydraulic fracturing, by 
balancing the positive and negative correlative rights of the interest 
owners competing for exclusive control of the subsurface.107 
                                                   
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See infra text accompanying notes 181–88. 
104. David E. Pierce, Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis to Define and Marshal 
Correlative Rights in the Oil and Gas Reservoir, 76 LA. L. REV. 787 (2016) [hereinafter Pierce, 
Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis].  
105. See generally, e.g., Pierce, supra note 43; David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: 
Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 241 
(2011) [hereinafter Pierce, Carol Rose]; David E. Pierce, Developing a Correlative Rights Doctrine 
to Accommodate Development of Oil and Gas in Arkansas, 68 ARK. L. REV. 407 (2015); Pierce, 
Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 104. 
106. Pierce, Carol Rose, supra note 105, at 242. 
107. Pierce, Employing Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 104, at 795–96. 
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Professor Tara Righetti has applied reservoir community analysis to 
intrareservoir disputes in the context of CCS.108 Under Righetti’s analysis, 
“rather than focusing on the creation or abolishment of property rights in 
the subsurface, the application of correlative rights reframes the interests 
in the CCS ‘storage complex’ as a form of ‘limited common property’ 
wherein possessive rights are more appropriately allocated according to 
principles of proportionate use and enjoyment.”109 Limited common 
property is described by Professor Carol Rose as an intermediate stage 
between fully public and fully private property in which property is held 
in common by members of a particular group—a “reservoir community” 
in Pierce’s model—but is held by the group to the exclusion of 
all  others.110 
Although a full discussion of the relationship between nuisance and 
correlative rights doctrine, limited common property, and reservoir 
community analysis exceeds the scope of this Article, it is submitted that 
one can view nuisance as the tort-law counterpart of the property-law 
doctrine of correlative rights.111 As the tort of trespass protects against 
invasions of possessory property rights, the tort of nuisance protects 
against invasions of correlative property rights. 
III. NUISANCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
SUBSURFACE  TRESPASS 
As this Part details, nuisance is a more context-sensitive model of 
governance than the exclusionary rule of trespass and therefore is better 
suited for coordinating conflicting uses of interconnected subsurface 
property.112 By applying nuisance, courts would have greater flexibility in 
tailoring efficient and equitable remedies when an unjustifiable 
                                                   
108. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10420.  
109. Id. at 10433 (citing Carol Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk 
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132 (1998)) (emphasis added).  
110. Carol Rose, Energy & Efficiency in the Realignment of Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 
(1990). As Rose has noted, effective administration of limited common property, in which owners’ 
rights are correlative, often requires active regulation by a state actor. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, & Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719–20 
(1986); see also Hall, supra note 92, at 363, 406 (arguing that adoption of a “modern” trespass rule 
privilege subsurface interferences would lead to waste of underground resources absent close 
regulation by conservation authorities).  
111. See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer & the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, & 
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 199 n.65 (1990) (discussing the evolution of the correlative rights 
doctrine from the predominate nineteenth century view of property as a natural right and noting the 
correlative rights “compromise” eventually failed, leading to the positivist view of property enshrined 
in the Restatement of Torts).  
112. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557, 
559–60 nn.2–4 (1992) (explaining the distinction between standards and rules as the extent to which 
“efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before [(rules)] or after [(standards)] the act”).  
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interference occurs. Application of nuisance would allow courts to temper 
harsh outcomes that might result under strict liability. One indication that 
nuisance is the appropriate remedy for subsurface property invasions is 
that, despite speaking in terms of trespass, courts already apply nuisance 
principles to resolve such cases. A review of the cases113 demonstrates that 
nuisance is already the de facto tort regime for subsurface interferences. 
It could only improve the clarity and consistency of courts’ treatment of 
these cases to expressly articulate the principles that 
implicitly  guide decisions. 
A. Nuisance Law: A Jungle No More 
The aim of nuisance law “is to achieve efficient and equitable solutions 
to problems created by discordant land uses.”114 Fundamentally, the law 
of nuisance mediates between two conflicting rights: “property owners 
have a right to control their land and use it to benefit their best interests, 
while the public and neighboring land owners have a right to prevent 
unreasonable use which substantially impairs the peaceful use and 
enjoyment of other land.”115 Paradigmatic nuisance cases involve suits to 
enjoin or recover damages caused by the negative externalities of 
otherwise socially valuable activities, such as stenches and fumes emitted 
from landfills,116 sewage treatment plants,117 agricultural activities,118 or 
industrial facilities like cement plants.119 Nuisance liability attaches for 
unjustified interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land 
regardless of whether the plaintiff’s right to exclude the defendant has 
been infringed. 
                                                   
113. See infra Part IV.  
114. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 1 (2019); see also Carroll v. Absolute Tank Removal, LLC, 834 A.2d 
823, 824 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (“Historically, private nuisance law has been used ‘as a means of 
efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses. All of the very 
useful and sophisticated economic analyses of private nuisance remedies published in recent years 
proceed on the basis that the goal of nuisance law is to achieve efficient and equitable solutions to 
problems created by discordant land uses.’”). 
115. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 1 (emphasis added).  
116. E.g., Miller v. Jasniski, 705 S.W.2d 442 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986).  
117. E.g., Adams v. Ark. City, 362 P.2d 829 (Kan. 1961). In water or sewage back-up cases liability 
usually lies in both nuisance and trespass. It is telling that a single occurrence can give rise to both 
torts. Trespass and nuisance are not mutually exclusive because they are causes of action for 
interference with distinct property interests—possession and use, respectively. See William L. 
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 414 (1942).  
118. One early leading nuisance decision, for example, involved an action on the case for nuisance 
against the defendant for constructing a hog sty near the plaintiff’s house. William Aldred’s Case 
[1610], 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 9 Coke Rep. 57b.  
119. E.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).  
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Characterizations of nuisance as a “jungle” focus primarily on the tort’s 
admittedly tangled history.120 According to Prosser, nuisance was long 
used as “a sort of legal garbage can” and a “substitute for any thought 
about a problem.”121 Prosser summarized the history of nuisance 
as follows: 
The uncertainty has been due largely to the series of historical 
accidents by which nuisance came to cover the invasion of 
different, and unrelated, kinds of interests and to refer to various 
kinds of conduct on the part of the defendant. The word first 
appears in connection with interferences with servitudes or other 
rights to the free use of land. There was an old criminal writ (the 
assize of nuisance), affording incidental civil relief, which was 
designed to cover invasions of the plaintiff’s land due to conduct 
wholly on the land of the defendant. In time this was supplanted 
by the more convenient action on the case for nuisance, which 
was limited strictly to interference with the use or 
enjoyment  of land.122 
Other commentators explain that, in its earliest form in the English legal 
system, nuisance was brought under a distinct common law writ. By the 
late fourteenth century lawyers largely abandoned the old writ and started 
suing under the newly recognized cause of action for trespass on the case, 
which often proved more strategic and convenient.123 The eventual 
elimination of the forms of action allowed courts and scholars flexibility 
to reimagine tort doctrine in general.124 According to Professor Dobbs, 
understanding of nuisance law became clearer following abolition as 
people grasped, first, that public and statutory nuisance cases should be 
analyzed separately from private nuisances and, second, that “private 
nuisance does not describe any particular conduct of the defendant, but a 
type of harm suffered by the plaintiff—impaired enjoyment of 
rights  in  land.”125 
Much of this clarification was accomplished in the Restatement of 
Torts. The Restatement defined private nuisance as a tort based on the 
nature of the interest invaded rather than the nature of the conduct giving 
rise to the invasion.126 One observer observed that it recast nuisance law 
                                                   
120. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 398 (2d ed. 2018). For an excellent and thorough 
history of the development of nuisance law, see Lewin, supra note 111, at 192. 
121. Prosser, supra note 117, at 410. 
122. Id. at 410–11; see also Lewin, supra note 111, at 192.  
123. Dillard et al., supra note 68, at 450–53; see also Ball, supra note 68, at 652.  
124. Dillard et al., supra note 68, at 450–53. 
125. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 398 (emphasis added).  
126. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 40, at 218–20 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).  
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as a “utilitarian calculus in which property rights were defined with the 
aim of achieving the greatest social good. By the Restatement’s definition, 
private nuisance is any claim involving “a non-trespassory invasion of 
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment in land,”127 further 
clarifying that “nuisance” describes the property right that is injured rather 
than the condition that causes injury. Actionable invasions could be either 
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and otherwise actionable 
under other torts like negligence or strict liability for 
ultrahazardous conduct. 
Section 826 defined “unreasonable” conduct by quantitatively 
weighing the “utility of the actor’s conduct” against “the gravity of harm” 
in what came to be known as the “balance of utilities test.”128 Under the 
test, conduct that damages another’s interest in the use of her land may be 
conducted without liability if its social utility is sufficiently great to justify 
the harm done. This was not a new concept in the law; it had previously 
been expressed as balancing the parties’ respective interests as opposed to 
the utility of their respective uses.129 
B. The Restatement (Second)’s Approach to Nuisance 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts retains the cost–benefit calculation 
embodied in the balance of utilities test but was amended to account for a 
large number of cases imposing strict liability for conduct that was not 
characterized as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous.130 The 
amendment resulted in the addition of section 829A, which imposes 
liability where an invasion is so substantial that the plaintiff should not be 
compelled to suffer it without compensation even if the defendant is 
without fault and the conduct is not abnormally dangerous. 
While many courts apply a nuisance doctrine similar to that articulated 
in the Restatement (Second), not as many have expressly adopted the 
entirety of the Restatement (Second).131 Given the diversity in private 
nuisance law across jurisdictions, however, the discussion in the 
remainder of this Article will refer to the Restatement (Second) as the 
                                                   
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).  
128. Id. § 826(a); see also Lewin, supra note 111, at 211.  
129. Comment a to section 826 of the Restatement (Second) cites an early case involving candle-
making where it was found there was no public nuisance because “[l]e utility del chose excusera le 
noisomeness del stink.” Id. § 826 cmt. a (citing STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 106 (1890)).  
130. See Lewin, supra note 111, at 222.  
131. See id. at 234–35.  
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generic standard.132 The following outline of its essential provisions will 
thus aid the subsequent discussion. 
Section 822 defines a private nuisance as a legal cause of invasion of 
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land that is 
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise 
actionable as negligence, recklessness, or strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities.133 Sections 826 through 831 contain standards for 
determining when an invasion is “unreasonable” under 822(a). Section 
826 instructs that an invasion is unreasonable if (a) the gravity of the harm 
outweighs the utility of the conduct (i.e., the balance of utilities test), or 
(b) the harm caused by the conduct is “serious” and the financial burden 
of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the 
continuation of the conduct infeasible.134 
Under section 826 the utility of an activity is not weighed in a vacuum 
but is evaluated with reference to what is done about its consequences. 
Hence a cement plant’s “utility” would be greater if it pays compensation 
to its neighbors for harm done than if it does not.135 Under subsection (b), 
conduct is “unreasonable” even if its utility outweighs the gravity of harm 
caused if the harm is “serious” and it would not render the conduct 
infeasible to continue if compensation were awarded.136 If the burden of 
making compensation would potentially put the conduct out of business, 
courts conduct a weighing process as it would occur in a claim 
for  injunction.137 
The gravity of the harm is determined under section 827 based on the 
following factors: (a) the extent of the harm; (b) the character of the harm; 
(c) the social value of the use invaded; (d) the suitability of the use 
invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the burden of the person 
harmed in avoiding the harm.138 The utility of conduct is determined under 
section 828 based on similar factors: (a) social value of the conduct; 
(b) suitability of the conduct to the character of locality; and 
(c) impracticability of avoiding the invasion.139 
                                                   
132. This Article’s use of the Restatement (Second) as the standard for nuisance doctrine is not 
intended as an endorsement of its utility-balancing approach, which has been subjected to powerful 
criticism. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian 
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979) (criticizing utilitarian approaches to defining property rights 
and nuisance law).  
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
134. Id. § 826. 
135. Id. § 826 cmt. e.  
136. Id. § 826(b). 
137. Id. § 826 cmt. f.  
138. Id. § 827.  
139. Id. § 828.  
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Section 831 deems conduct to be unreasonable if it is unsuited to the 
character of the locality and causes significant harm to a use that is well 
suited to the locality.140 Finally section 829A incorporates the 
compensation principle, noted above, by deeming otherwise justifiable 
conduct unreasonable “if the harm resulting from the invasion is severe 
and greater than the other should be required to bear without 
compensation.”141 
C. The Nonpossessory Nature of Subsurface Property Intrusions 
Courts often conflate trespass with nuisance, labelling conduct a 
“trespass” but applying nuisance standards to resolve it.142 Indeed trespass 
and nuisance border each other and can both arise from one incident.143 
But trespass and nuisance are distinct because they exist to protect 
different property rights. One act can occasion both an invasion of 
another’s right of possession (a trespass) and her right of reasonable use 
and enjoyment (a nuisance). It follows that only owners whose property 
interests are possessory may sue for trespass.144 While courts have not 
explicitly classified subsurface property as possessory or nonpossessory, 
as Professor Righetti notes, this classification “may prove dispositive as 
to the remedies available to owners for subsurface intrusions.”145 
Consequently, in distinguishing trespass and nuisance as alternative tort 
remedies for invasions of subsurface property, it is essential to first 
examine, as the following section does, whether subsurface property is 
possessory or nonpossessory. 
                                                   
140. Id. § 831. 
141. Id. § 829A. Per Professor Lewin,  
Any inquiry by a court should start with section 829A, for if the harm is sufficiently ‘severe,’ 
the plaintiff is entitled to compensation in damages regardless of the utility of the defendant’s 
activity and regardless of whether damage liability would cause the defendant to cease the 
activity. If the damage is not sufficiently ‘severe’ to trigger section 829A, it may nevertheless be 
‘serious’ enough to warrant compensation under section 826(b) without regard to the utility of 
the defendant’s activity, but only if damage liability would not cause the defendant to cease the 
activity. Finally, if the plaintiff’s damages were not severe enough to warrant compensation 
under section 829A and the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation under section 826(b)—
either because the damages were not sufficiently serious or because damage liability would cause 
cessation of the activity—the plaintiff might still be entitled to compensation (as well as an 
injunction) under the balance of utilities test.  
Lewin, supra note 111, at 227.  
142. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 399.  
143. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 399; Reynolds, supra note 66, at 228.  
144. See Kulander & Shaw, supra note 44, at 70 (collecting cases); Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, 
Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeal, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 341–42 
(1990) (discussing nuisance as the traditional cause of action to remedy injuries to nonpossessory 
property interests).   
145. Righetti, supra note 10, at 10428–29.  
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1. What Is “Possession”? 
The root of all title to property at common law is first possession.146 
Possession grants the possessor the right to exclude others from the thing 
possessed.  To modern theorists, possession is the sina qua non of 
property. As Professor Thomas Merrill explains, “Give someone the right 
to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce 
relative to the human demand for it, and you give them property. Deny 
someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.”147 All other 
rights associated with ownership of property, according to Professor 
Merrill, derive from and depend on the right to exclude. 
Carol Rose has identified two “great principles” defining the meaning 
of “possession”: “(1)  notice to the world of a claim to property through a 
clear act, and (2)  reward to useful labor.”148 The rationale of granting 
possession to reward useful labor is subsumed in Rose’s first definition 
because application of useful labor to a thing is itself an act giving notice 
to the world.149 To Rose, possession is a kind of statement communicating 
the speaker’s claim over a thing to an audience comprised of all others 
who might be interested in claiming the thing themselves. The purpose of 
the statement is to establish the right to exclude. Dean Wigmore defines 
possession of real property similarly: “Possession is a relation of control 
of a thing as against other persons. A possession consists of two elements, 
with reference to the area deemed to be possessed, (a)  the area actually 
controlled against others by the bodily force of the person; [and] (b)  the 
area willed by him to be included in his potential control, as expressed in 
his acts of will.”150 To Wigmore the “potential control” appears to be 
tantamount to constructive possession and stretches as far as the possessor 
is able to indicate through acts of expression. 
Legal rules designate the types of statements that constitute notice of 
an exclusive claim to the relevant audience.151 Possession of the surface 
area of real property is usually marked by fences or cultivation, or 
constructively by legal descriptions in deeds.152 Once established, 
possession can be lost by failing to communicate the claim continually 
                                                   
146. Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Rose, supra 
note 62, at 75.  
147. Merrill, supra note 62, at 730.  
148. Rose, supra note 62, at 77–78, 83. 
149. Id. 
150. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS WITH NOTES & A SUMMARY 
OF PRINCIPLES app’x A, § 118 (1912).  
151. Rose, supra note 62, at 87–88. To establish claims to objects of nature, like land, the law has 
designated the statements of “cultivation, manufacture, and development.” Id.  
152. WIGMORE, supra note 150, app’x A, § 118.  
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and allowing another to invade the object and communicate a superior 
claim.153 Possessors must guard against such invaders, which they can do 
either through self-help ejectment or an action for trespass.154 
Some things, like easements,155 are inherently incapable of clear 
demarcation and thus of possession. Claims to these things are established 
only through systems of secondary demarcation like land records.156 Other 
things, like the airspace above land, are often said to be capable only of 
limited or “effective possession.”157 An early twentieth century 
commentator noted that under this view, “[a] man cannot own air in its 
free state; the rule is universal. A man may have an easement for light, or 
an easement for free access of air, or a right against the pollution of his 
air, but the air itself he cannot own.”158 An early court explained the 
property interest in airspace likewise, stating, “[i]t would be vain to treat 
property in airspace upon the same footing as property which can be 
seized, touched, occupied, handled, cultivated, built upon and utilized in 
every feature.”159 Thus, authorities tend to speak of the surface owner as 
possessing the airspace above her land only as far as it is necessary to 
support her use and enjoyment of the land.160 
2. Is the Subsurface Property Interest Possessory? 
Like airspace, the deep subsurface cannot be seized, touched, or 
utilized as readily as the surface of land. Unlike airspace, the deep 
subsurface is impossible to efficiently demarcate through use or 
development as to communicate an exclusive claim, except indirectly 
                                                   
153. Rose, supra note 62, at 78–79, 81.  
154. These legal actions were originally intended to avoid breaches of the peace that often 
accompany the alternative remedy of self-help. Bohlen, supra note 72, at 318–19, 19 n.19; Henry E. 
Smith, Self-Help & the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 81–86 (2005).  
155. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “easement” as, “[a]n interest in land owned by another 
person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific 
limited purpose (such as to cross it for access to a public road).” Easement, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
156. Rose, supra note 62, at 83.  
157. Leo Jaffe, Air Law—Trespass by Airplane, 9 TEX. L. REV. 240, 243 (1931). The concept of 
“effective possession” was criticized widely by contemporary scholars for being obscure and 
“difficult of both definition and application.” Ball, supra note 68, at 641–42.  
158. Ball, supra note 68, at 632–33.  
159. Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 390 (Mass. 1930).  
160. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (“The landowner owns at least 
as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”). The 
fact that courts view the airspace as only an effective possessory interest has played a role in the 
abandonment of trespass rules in favor of nuisance in airspace overflight cases. See Reynolds, supra 
note 66, at 235–37.  
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through possession of the surface, because it is hidden from view.161 In 
addition, a pore space-owner has no practical means excluding others 
from invading its claimed pore space, except perhaps at great expense.162 
Further, and perhaps more important, it is highly difficult even with expert 
evidence to monitor the subsurface to determine whether an invasion of 
pore space has occurred.163 Thus, although the substances contained 
within pore space may be deemed subject to possession while in place,164 
the pore space itself is no more, and perhaps less, susceptible of 
possession than the airspace. 
This last conclusion is loosely consistent with Dean Wigmore’s view 
of subterranean land ownership. In Wigmore’s conception a landowner 
can possess only the surface area. The surface includes certain 
“appurtenant rights” in subjacent and superjacent space. Per Wigmore, 
“The space subjacent to the land is included without limit as to distance 
downwards. The right in this aspect protects merely against an intrusion 
into the lower soil or a removal of it. But an act which causes the surface 
to fall is a violation of the main right.”165 The appurtenance Wigmore 
                                                   
161. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 1, at 163–64. As Lowe et al. explain, adverse possession requires 
open and notorious conduct for the statutory period in order to give notice of the adverse possessor’s 
claim to the true owner. Hence, where the mineral estate has been severed prior to the beginning of 
an adverse possession, the possessor’s use of the surface will not ripen into title to the mineral estate 
as well. Id.  
162. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., LC, 351 S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (“Mineral 
owners can protect their interests from drainage through means such as pooling or drilling their own 
wells. This is not necessarily the case when a landowner is trying to protect his or her subsurface from 
migrating wastewater.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Righetti, supra note 10, at 10428 
(“Owners of pore space may develop their interest into a stronger possessory claim based on their 
use, and yet at any time prior to that use, they are also subject to dispossession by virtue of their 
neighbor’s use.”). It appears dispossession by a neighbor is equally possible after a subsurface owner 
“uses” her pore space because pore space “can be filled, emptied and refilled” at any time. See id.  
163. See, e.g., Hill v. Sw. Energy Co., 858 F.3d 481, 485–87 (8th Cir. 2017) (reviewing district 
court’s exclusion of expert testimony pertaining to the spread of injected “fracking waste”); Raymond 
v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 272 n.7 (E.D. La. 1988) (“Considering the expert 
testimony in this case regarding the uncertainty of determining if, when, and where injected salt water 
might migrate, it is unlikely that an operator would undertake to execute leases with all landowners 
under whose property injected salt water might migrate.”); Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 
So.2d 955, 959 n.9 (La. 1986) (“Noting that the earth is round, we point out that a surface tract’s 
subsurface measurement must necessarily narrow as it approaches the center point of 
the . . . boundaries as the available area diminishes. Just how much or how little plaintiff’s subsurface 
ownership has narrowed at a depth of two miles is a peripheral question which, needless to say, will 
not be addressed in this opinion.”); Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 993 (Ohio 1996) 
(“All of these and more disputed variables went into the construction of the hypothetical models that 
attempted to illustrate the lateral extent of the migration. Given all these variables, there were great 
difficulties in appellants’ establishing, as a factual matter, that a property invasion had occurred, so 
that appellants’ claim must be regarded as somewhat speculative.”). 
164. Some states characterize interests in minerals, such as oil and gas, in place, before production, 
as possessory and others do not. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 17–75 (discussing mineral 
ownership theories across jurisdictions).  
165. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 150, app’x A, § 104.   
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describes is negative in nature. It is a right to be free from conditions in 
superjacent and subjacent space that diminish the surface area’s 
habitability or availability for economic use.166 Wigmore’s appurtenances 
are probably classifiable as incorporeal hereditaments—nonpossessory 
rights attached to ownership of land.167 Doctrinally, after the writ system, 
the only tort generally available to remedy an invasion of a nonpossessory 
interest in real property is nuisance; trespass is not available where there 
is no violation of a right to exclude.168 
It should be no surprise then that, while purporting to apply trespass, 
courts in subsurface invasion cases apply nuisance-like standards. One 
inference to draw from these cases is that the owner of a fee interest in 
real property owns a nonpossessory interest in the subsurface strata, along 
the lines of Dean Wigmore’s subterranean appurtenance. Invasions of the 
subsurface interest are, consequently, nontrespassory. They are nuisances. 
IV. COURTS’ NONTRESPASSORY TREATMENT OF 
INVASIONS OF SUBSURFACE PROPERTY INTERESTS 
Courts have been hesitant to consider the possessory or nonpossessory 
nature of a property interest in subsurface land.169 Regardless whether or 
not a fee interest in surface property entitles the owner to a possessory 
interest in the subjacent rock and pore space, a review of subsurface 
invasion cases reveals that courts resolve unauthorized intrusions into 
these things as nontrespassory invasions. Despite calling them subsurface 
“trespasses,” courts treat these intrusions as implicating only use—and 
not possession—of the rock or pore space.170 The clearest indication that 
courts are concerned with use, as opposed to possession, is their 
                                                   
166. Id. §§ 101–102, 104. Professor Louise A. Halper notes a similar type of property interest that 
developed as the need to protect owners of property adjacent to the then-newly constructed elevated 
railway in New York City became acute. According to Halper, courts expanded their recognition of 
property interests to include an “interest [appurtenant to land] in being free from injury . . . in the form 
of a limited easement; limited in that the [owner] could do nothing with the easement except market 
it.” Halper, supra note 144, at 344.  
167. Incorporeal Hereditament, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
168. See supra section I.A.  
169. E.g., Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862, 867 (Wyo. 1927) (“We have already stated that there 
was a technical violation of the rights of the plaintiff. We need not determine what sort of an estate 
plaintiffs had in the land.”).  
170. Professors Keeton and Jones seem to have identified this phenomenon among Texas’s pre-
Garza hydraulic fracturing cases. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 71, at 267 (“The invasions in these 
cases are both direct and intentional, and unless it can be said that there is no interference with 
possession either because of some distinction between surface and subsurface invasions or because 
the water and the sand particles in solution do not constitute the type of ‘thing’ that is sufficient to 
constitute a legal interference with possession, there would seem to be a technical trespass and a use 
of another’s property. Technically, it is not the fracturing of the formation that would constitute the 
trespass but rather the intrusion into the formation of the sand and water.”). 
 
13 Schremmer.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:44 PM 
2020] GETTING PAST POSSESSION 343 
 
application of legal standards and remedies associated with nuisance, as 
opposed to trespass.171 Courts generally impose a liability rule that entitles 
the affected owner to damages but no injunction. This holds across 
jurisdictions and types of conduct, including waste disposal, enhanced oil 
recovery, natural gas storage, directional drilling, and hydraulic 
fracturing. The remainder of this section surveys cases arising in each 
context to illustrate that a consensus of courts analyzes subsurface 
intrusions as nontrespassory nuisances. The final section discusses how a 
nuisance analysis could apply to resolve subsurface interferences arising 
from CCS and other emerging technologies. 
A. Waste Disposal Cases 
The primary waste associated with oil and gas production by volume is 
produced water. Produced water is the brine originally trapped in 
reservoirs that is brought to the surface in oil and gas extraction.172 Best 
practice in modern oil and gas production is to dispose of produced water 
by injection into geologic reservoirs. Saltwater disposal wells are 
permitted under the federal Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
program,173 as are several other classes of injection wells, including those 
for hazardous and nonhazardous fluid wastes.174 To obtain administrative 
injection authority under the UIC program, operators must have the 
consent of the owner of the surface interest in the tract where the well is 
to be located. UIC wells are thus typically permitted on relatively small 
tracts of land in comparison with the subsurface area in which the injected 
fluids migrate over time. 
Disputes arise when fluid injected in a UIC well crosses the boundaries 
of the tract where the well is permitted and into the subsurface pore space 
of neighboring owners without their consent. The key question in these 
cases tends to be “whether the owner has a right of recovery on a trespass 
theory for the unauthorized invasion and use of the space underneath the 
                                                   
171. “Trespass” as used here refers to traditional trespass quare clausum fregit. It should be noted 
that courts appear to treat claims for subsurface invasions as claims for trespass on the case. This 
explains the requirement most courts impose on plaintiffs to show actual injury to use or enjoyment 
of the property and the infrequency of injunctive relief.  
172. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 863 F.2d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(describing produced water).  
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (Supp. 2012). Subject to federal oversight, the UIC program is 
primarily administered by individual states. Id. § 300h.  
174. These are Class I wells, which inject hazardous and nonhazardous wastes; Class II wells, 
which inject produced water; Class III wells, which inject fluids to dissolve and extract minerals; 
Class IV wells, which inject hazardous or radioactive waste in shallow geologic reservoirs; Class V 
wells, which inject nonhazardous waste into shallow geologic reservoirs; and Class VI wells, which 
inject CO2 for geologic sequestration. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (2019).  
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surface,” even if no physical damage or interference with the owner’s use 
or enjoyment of the property occurred as a result.175 The issue arises 
because, given the complexity of predicting where injected fluid could 
migrate, it is unlikely any lessee would ever attempt to get the consent of 
all owners whose land the fluid might migrate.176 This is also the principal 
question surrounding liability for migration of sequestered CO2. 
As will be seen in the following review of cases, an owner generally 
does not have a right to recovery on a true trespass theory for the 
unauthorized invasion and use of the space under her surface property. 
Although courts label such claims as “trespasses,” they tend to eschew 
applying any of the rules or remedies traditionally associated with 
trespass. Instead, they require a showing of actual harm in addition to the 
fact of the unauthorized invasion and deny ejectment and nominal 
damages as remedies. Moreover, courts frequently reference the social 
value of the injector’s activity and weigh it against the severity of the harm 
sustained by the plaintiff. Such departures from the traditional tort render 
these decisions unrecognizable as trespass cases. Rather, the typical 
analysis in fluid injection cases closely resembles the tort of nuisance. 
Reviewing these cases, it is clear that the strict, possession-protecting 
provisions of trespass are inapplicable to property interests in the 
subsurface, but that the flexible, use-accommodating precepts of nuisance 
are appropriate. 
In FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Texas Natural Resources Conservation 
Commission,177 for example, the Texas Court of Appeals required a 
showing of actual harm to establish liability for “trespass” from the 
unauthorized invasion of injected wastewater. FPL Farming, Ltd. (FPL 
Farming) appealed the commission’s order granting two injection well 
permits allowing Environmental Processing Systems, L.P. (EPS) to inject 
nonhazardous wastewater into a deep subsurface saltwater formation.178 It 
was projected that the injected wastewater would enter under neighboring 
land owned by FPL Farming within ten years of initial injection.179 FPL 
Farming challenged the injection permits, contending that granting the 
permits exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of FPL Farming’s property without  compensation. 
“Assuming without deciding that FPL Farming has ‘existing rights’ in 
the deep subsurface beneath its land,” the court affirmed the commission’s 
                                                   
175. Keeton & Jones, supra note 71, at 268.  
176. Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 272 n.7 (E.D. La. 1988).  
177. No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2003).  
178. Id.  
179. Id.  
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finding that the injection would not impair any existing legal rights.180 The 
court elaborated, “In essence, FPL Farming argues that migration [of 
wastewater] alone will impair FPL Farming’s existing rights. We 
disagree, concluding . . . that some measurement of harm must 
accompany the migration for there to be impairment.”181 In so holding, 
the court noted the commission’s position that “property owners do not 
have the right to exclude deep subsurface migration of fluids.”182 
FPL Farming also lost on its claim that the permits effected a physical 
taking by allowing the wastewater plume to occupy its subsurface. A 
physical taking occurs when the government authorizes a “physical 
occupation” of property. Under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.,183 a physical occupation occurs when the government action 
“destroys three rights associated with the ownership of property: the 
power to possess, use, and dispose.”184 The FPL Farming Court was 
unpersuaded by FPL’s argument that it “lost its right to possess the 
subsurface because the amended permits hamper its right to exclude 
EPS’s waste plume, which is projected to migrate onto its property within 
the next ten years.”185 FPL’s Loretto claim failed accordingly because it 
lacked possessory rights in the subsurface.186 
Likewise, in Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,187 the Ohio Supreme Court 
defined the surface owner plaintiffs’ pore space rights to include only “the 
right to exclude invasions of the subsurface property that actually interfere 
with [their] reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface.”188 In 
Chance, several landowners sued BP Chemicals for damages allegedly 
caused by lateral migration of hazardous byproducts injected at BP’s 
nearby chemical refinery.189 The plaintiffs asserted several common law 
claims; the only issue that received significant discussion on appeal, 
however, was whether the trial court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show 
“some type of physical damages or interference with use” to establish a 
                                                   
180. Id. at *3. 
181. Id. at *4. 
182. Id. at *3.  
183. 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
184. FPL Farming, 2003 WL 247183, at *5 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).  
185. Id.  
186. The result in FPL Farming is especially notable when viewed in light of the facts of Loretto 
itself. There the Court held that placement of small television cable on Loretto’s five-story apartment 
building constituted a physical occupation of the plaintiff’s property and an unconstitutional taking, 
noting, “the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control 
the use of the property . . . .” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.  
187. 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996). 
188. Id. at 992 (emphasis added).  
189. Id. at 990. 
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trespass.190 The plaintiffs argued that any unauthorized invasion of their 
subsurface would constitute trespass irrespective of actual interference 
with preexisting use because common law trespass presumes damage.191 
Affirming the trial court, the Ohio Supreme Court found the incursion 
of hazardous waste did not violate the plaintiffs’ interest in the subsurface. 
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ right to possess the subsurface is 
limited in the same way a landowner’s right to possess the sky is limited 
under Causby, for instance, only to the extent of the owner’s existing or 
foreseeable use.192 Applying Chance in a gas storage case, the Northern 
District of Ohio in Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC193  put a 
finer point on the rule in this way:  
If a landowner’s right to exclude a subsurface invader is limited 
to those portions of the subsurface the landowner actually uses or 
foreseeably may use, then Chance should also stand for the 
converse proposition that one has no right to exclude a subsurface 
‘invader’ from portions of the subsurface that one does not  use.194 
The Sixth Circuit’s subsequent opinion affirming Baatz refined the rule 
once more: “[T]he Landowners do not have a ‘reasonable and foreseeable 
use’ of their subsurface. As such, the Landowners do not have a present 
possessory interest in their subsurface . . . .”195 
A recent Texas Court of Appeals Case, Swift Energy Operating, LLC 
v. Regency Field Services, LLC,196 demonstrates that Texas courts view 
subsurface invasions as actionable only when they interfere with an 
owner’s use and enjoyment. Swift sued Regency for trespass when 
Regency’s injected waste gas migrated under Swift’s lease. The parties 
disputed on what date the two-year limitations period accrued on Swift’s 
trespass claim.197 Regency asserted on summary judgment that Swift’s 
trespass claims accrued when the injectate entered Swift’s leases. Swift 
countered that no cause of action accrued “merely because of the 
uninvited intrusion of injectate into the subsurface space covered by” 
Swift’s leases,198 and argued instead that any claim arose only when the 
                                                   
190. Id. at 993. 
191. Id. at 993. 
192. Id. at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vill. of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 
278 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Ohio 1972)).  
193. 295 F. Supp. 3d 776 (N.D. Ohio 2018), aff’d, 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019). 
194. Id. at 785. 
195. Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 929 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 2019). 
196. No. 04-17-00638-CV, 2019 WL 1547608 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2019).  
197. Id. at *3–4.  
198. Id. at *3 (Swift cited Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 
2017), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 280–292).  
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injectate “actually infringe[d] on [Swift’s] mineral rights.”199 The 
appellate panel sided with Swift finding the cause of action accrued only 
because “the injected plume overlaid Swift’s leased depths and would 
require Swift to drill any new wells through the contamination, and the 
injectate had reached Swift’s existing well bores and would corrode 
them,” and thus affected Swift’s rights in the mineral lease.200 In other 
words, the mere incursion of unauthorized substances did not implicate 
Swift’s rights in the subsurface and therefore the incursion must have 
been  nontrespassory. 
Similarly, in Raymond v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp.,201 the Eastern 
District of Louisiana found “no legally actionable trespass” for migration 
into the plaintiffs’ subsurface of saltwater injected on adjoining land.202 
The plaintiffs sought damages for trespass measured by the rental value 
of the pore space occupied by the wastewater. Although the claim failed 
for other reasons, the court commented there would be no actionable 
trespass even if the plaintiffs could prove the invading water was 
unauthorized because they suffered no “injury or inconvenience” and 
ownership rights are limited as necessary to prevent waste of 
hydrocarbons and needless drilling.203 
                                                   
199. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 2019 WL 1547608 at *3.  
200. Id. at *4.  
201. 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1988). 
202. Id. at 273.  
203. Id. at 273–75 (citing Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986) and W. 
Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1950)); see also Jefferson 
Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (“If saltwater injected by Jefferson 
Island did migrate beneath the Boudreaux plaintiffs’ property a mile underground, that fluid did 
nothing more than displace existing saltwater and in no way affected the use or enjoyment of the 
land.”). The Kansas Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in Crawford v. Hrabe, in which the 
court wrote,  
While our discussion of trespass cases is helpful, it is not conclusive. We turn to consideration 
of the economics and practical usage of salt water disposal or other water in a secondary recovery 
operation. . . . In the final analysis our decision must . . . be driven by the facts of this particular 
case. The secondary recovery operations have increased production. This increase is beneficial 
to all parties. Off-lease salt water is economically available. To drill a supply well on the Hrabe 
property would increase expenses of lease operations. 44 P.3d 442, 452 (Kan. 2002). Texas 
courts do not, as the Crawford Court did, conflate the social value of saltwater disposal with the 
value of injection for enhanced oil recovery. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that  
injecting substances to aid in the extraction of minerals serves a different purpose than does 
injecting wastewater. We have recognized that ‘[i]t cannot be disputed that [secondary 
operations to recover oil and gas] should be encouraged’ to ‘increase the ultimate recovery of oil 
and gas’ . . . . Manziel and Garza considered the justification for the rule of capture—greater oil 
and gas recovery—in their analyses. However, the rule of capture is not applicable to wastewater 
injection. Mineral owners can protect their interests from drainage through means such as 
pooling or drilling their own wells. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W. 
3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (internal citations omitted).  
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The courts in the above cases did not award damages for fluid 
invasions. When they do award damages for fluid migration courts tend 
to be unclear about the doctrinal basis for the award. In Cassinos v. Union 
Oil Co. of California,204 for example, the California Court of Appeals 
affirmed an award of damages to a mineral interest owner based on the oil 
and gas lessee’s injection of off-lease produced water.205 The lessee 
injected the water into a well on the mineral owner’s lease with the 
permission of the surface interest owner and the injection interfered with 
existing oil production from the lease. The court noted that in California 
the mineral estate is nonpossessory and mineral owners enjoy merely an 
exclusive right to take minerals in place, otherwise classified as a profit-
à-prendre. Purporting to apply this doctrine, Cassinos affirmed the trial 
court’s award of damages and held that the injection constituted a 
“permanent trespass” of the mineral owner’s nonpossessory interest.206 
Cassinos’s reasoning illustrates a pervasive problem in subsurface 
invasion cases. Even though the classification of a mineral estate in 
California (a nonpossessory profit-à-prendre) does not include possession 
rights, Cassinos held that interference with a mineral interest owner’s 
ability to produce minerals constitutes a permanent trespass. This cannot 
be correct doctrinally unless “trespass” means trespass on the case. On the 
contrary, the property interest affected by the defendant’s injection in 
Cassinos must have been the mineral owner’s right to access and produce, 
i.e. use, the minerals. Infringement of the right to use interests in real 
property is a nuisance. 
The error in Cassinos is not merely a labelling mistake. Labeling 
conduct a “trespass” incorporates a particular legal rule of liability and 
particular remedies that meaningfully differ from the legal standard and 
remedies that apply when conduct is labeled a “nuisance.” When courts 
like Cassinos label subsurface invasions “trespasses,” they often find that 
the rules and remedies for trespasses do not fit the circumstances or 
achieve desirable results. Courts then modify the rules of trespass to 
provide flexibility to accommodate the competing interests. As FPL 
Farming, Chance, and Cassinos illustrate, modifications include: 
(a) requiring proof of actual damages; (b) eliminating nominal damages 
and ejectment as remedies; and (c) weighing the plaintiff’s injuries against 
the economic or social value of the defendant’s injection to determine 
liability. Each of these modifications tend to morph the tort into nuisance, 
which, based on the nature of the property interest truly implicated, 
provides the appropriate analytical framework. 
                                                   
204. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 582, 584.  
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Oklahoma courts do apply a “modified” private nuisance doctrine to 
resolve subsurface invasions by injected fluid.207 Oklahoma’s modified 
nuisance doctrine “is essentially the common law doctrine as altered by a 
provision in the Oklahoma Constitution which the Oklahoma courts have 
said removes the common law elements of carelessness or 
unreasonableness.”208 Thus where a nuisance is found strict liability 
attaches. In determining whether conduct constitutes a nuisance, 
Oklahoma courts apply a reasonableness rule under which “a person may 
use his property in any lawful manner, except that he must not use it so as 
to injure or damage his neighbor.”209 It is not clear what standards 
Oklahoma courts apply to determine the reasonableness of a given use. It 
can be observed, however, that no liability attaches in cases where only 
saltwater invades the plaintiff’s land and the plaintiff can show no actual 
damages beyond the fact of the invasion. The opinions justify this result 
based on the importance of wastewater disposal to the industry 
and  society.210 
Where an invasion causes actual damage, Oklahoma courts award 
compensation regardless of any justification for the invasion. Courts have 
interpreted Oklahoma’s constitution to contain a strict liability provision 
protecting a landowner against any losses “in the nature of real and 
substantial injury to his property, resulting from the use of adjacent or 
nearby property by its owner.”211 In West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. 
Lillard,212 for example, the plaintiff showed that injected saltwater from 
the defendant’s operations precluded the plaintiff from producing and 
pulling the casing from a well on his property. Lillard awarded 
compensatory damages without considering reasonableness or social 
utility of the defendant’s conduct. The court also did not consider whether 
the expense of paying compensation might render the defendant’s 
injection operations infeasible. 
These fluid disposal cases illustrate that courts conceive of subsurface 
property rights merely as use rights that do not entitle the owner to 
exclusively claim any portion of subsurface strata it is not presently, or 
foreseeably will be, using. The plaintiffs in FPL Farming, Chance, and 
Raymond did not show any injury to existing or foreseeable uses of the 
property and consequently were held not to have an actionable claim 
based on the invasion of their subsurface. The plaintiffs in Cassinos and 
                                                   
207. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 441 (10th Cir. 1971). 
208. Id. 
209. W. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 973 (Okla. 1950).  
210. See, e.g., id. at 969–71 (noting that if saltwater disposal requires the consent of all persons 
under whose land the water might migrate it would be practically prohibited).  
211. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23; Fairfax Oil Corp. v. Bolinger, 97 P.2d 574, 575 (Okla. 1939).  
212. 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).  
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Lillard, in contrast, proved the migration of injected fluids diminished 
their ability to produce oil and gas from existing wells. Those plaintiffs 
were judged to have a claim for damages. It appears that the rule 
developing in fluid injection disputes is that landowners are not entitled 
to exclude third-party injectors from using their subsurface to store 
injected waste, but injectors are strictly liable for any actual damages 
caused by the injection. The rule imposes liability where the complaining 
owner can show an interference with its use rights. This would not be the 
expected trend if the surface estate’s interest in underlying pore space 
were possessory. 
This trespass-based strict liability approach potentially entails two 
broad problems that could be tempered or avoided by applying common 
law nuisance. First, the rule does not contain criteria for determining when 
the injector’s conduct is sufficiently important to privilege any resulting 
invasion. In other words, it is not clear when resulting damages constitute 
legally actionable injury; or, in the jargon of the early common lawyers, 
when damnum is injuria.213 Nuisance law, in contrast, furnishes rules for 
determining when resulting damages are wrongful and constitute legal 
injury. As an example, the Restatement (Second)’s version of nuisance 
distinguishes mere damages from legal injury by comparing the utility of 
the offending conduct with the gravity of the resulting harm. Under this 
version of nuisance, injection activities are privileged, and resulting harm 
is damnum absque injuria, if the injection is more socially valuable than 
the harm to the affected subsurface owner is severe. Nuisance is thus 
capable of distinguishing between harms a subsurface owner must suffer 
without compensation and those which must be compensated. 
Second, strict liability may prohibit capital-intensive socially valuable 
waste storage activities such as CCS.214 The subsurface trespass rule 
places the costs of an injector’s conduct with the injector regardless of 
whether the injector is best able to bear the costs (i.e., is the least-cost 
avoider among the parties) or whether the costs may be so great as to 
render the socially valuable conduct infeasible. Under such an approach a 
prospective CO2 injector, for example, would not only be potentially 
liable for all damages caused by its injection, but would also lack a well-
                                                   
213. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 449, 9th ed. 2009 (defining “damnum” as “a loss; 
damage suffered”), with id. at 856 (defining “injuria” as a legal wrong). See Halper, supra note 144, 
at 311 & n.43 (“Bracton said, as an illustration of the difference between damnum and injuria, that 
one who ‘erects a mill on his own land and takes from his neighbor his own suit and that of 
others; . . . does his neighbor damage but no injuria since he is not prohibited by law or a constitution 
from having or erecting a mill.’” (quoting 3 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 
164 (S. Thorne ed. 1977)).  
214. It has been noted that strict liability regimes tend to induce actors to regulate the frequency of 
activity as well as the level of care in conducting the activity. See STEVEN SHAVELL, AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21–32 (1987) (describing the incentive effects of strict 
liability regimes).  
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defined legal standard for determining liability. It should be further noted 
that while the rental or use value of pore space for waste storage has been 
considered de minimis, the advent of commercial CCS (particularly with 
potentially lucrative tax incentives) may help establish an economic value 
for this right in certain areas. Consequently, precedent holding that use of 
another’s pore space for fluid disposal is not compensable as actual 
damages may need to be rethought. As the value increases, courts 
employing a strict liability standard may find it necessary to compensate 
nonconsenting owners even if it would render the storage 
project infeasible. 
Additionally, nuisance law provides courts flexibility in tailoring 
remedies for subsurface invasions. The main remedies available under 
nuisance encompass compensatory and punitive damages, injunction 
abating the nuisance, and (rarely) a “compensated injunction” that abates 
the nuisance but requires the plaintiff to pay the costs of abatement.215 
Courts also have the discretion to limit or refuse injunctions in private 
nuisance cases if the defendant is carrying on an activity that is so socially 
or economically important the injunction would do more harm than 
good.216 A great deal of study has been done on the efficiencies available 
through various nuisance remedies and combinations of remedies. There 
is a deep literature for litigants and courts to draw from to maximize utility 
and efficiency in nuisance cases.217 Though a discussion of the most 
efficient remedies for subsurface nuisances exceeds the scope of this 
Article, it is reasonably clear that the variety of alternatives would 
improve on the rule of strict liability imposed by trespass. 
Nuisance remedies also address Professor Anderson’s concern that 
nonconsenting owners should be compensated for serious damage from 
invasions. Under the compensation principle, even if the injector’s 
conduct is reasonable, both the unauthorized use of the pore space and any 
special losses, like damage to producing wells, would be compensable if 
so severe the plaintiff should not be required to bear them without 
compensation. This approach would achieve the result desired by the 
subsurface trespass theory (compensation for damages when fairness 
requires) without imposing absolute liability on socially 
beneficial  conduct.  
It should be noted that a strict-liability approach has (at least) one 
advantage over utility-balancing: it more clearly specifies property rights, 
                                                   
215. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 404.  
216. Id. 
217. See id. See generally, e.g., Lewin, supra note 111, at 236–80 (surveying law and economics 
literature of nuisance).  
 
13 Schremmer.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:44 PM 
352 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:315 
 
which often improves bargaining efficiency between rights holders.218 For 
instance, under Professor Anderson’s subsurface trespass theory,219 
subsurface owners clearly have the right to inject fluid into common 
reservoirs even if it migrates into a neighbor’s portion of the reservoir, but 
clearly do not have the right to cause any damage to the neighbor as a 
result. Ideally, given the clarity of these entitlements, a subsurface owner 
that wanted to inject fluid into a common reservoir could purchase from 
neighboring owners their right to receive damages and thus avoid disputes 
before they happen. 
The physical reality of subsurface reservoirs, however, means there are 
many neighbors to bargain with. The presence of multiple players 
increases transaction costs and the possibility that one will hold out. 
Moreover, because reservoirs have unique physical characteristics, if 
bargaining fails or would be prohibitively expensive, the would-be 
injector may not be able to simply pick up and move to a different one. In 
the case of resources like interconnected reservoirs, which are depleting 
resources owned in common among potentially numerous rights holders, 
the costs of bargaining are high and undermine the simplifying effect of 
allocating rights in a strict liability regime.220 The common law 
traditionally responded to conditions of high transaction costs with more 
flexible and discretionary doctrines, like nuisance.221 
B. Enhanced Recovery Cases 
When initial or “primary” production222 of oil and gas from a reservoir 
ceases, and natural pressures no longer drive reservoir fluids into 
wellbores for production, it becomes necessary to reenergize the reservoir 
artificially through “enhanced recovery.”223 Enhanced recovery involves 
injecting into the depleted reservoir water, chemicals, heat, or CO2.224 
                                                   
218. See Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 13, 19 (1985) (analyzing property law responses to situations involving higher and 
lower transaction costs). For the classic articulation of the role of definition of property rights in 
transaction costs, see generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. J. (1960).  
219. See supra section II.B.1 (discussing Anderson’s work). While Anderson’s theory clearly 
specifies entitlements to use another’s portion of the reservoir when the use is societally desirable, it 
does not specify what uses fit this category. This element of the theory may undermine its ability 
ultimately to define subsurface rights clearly. 
220. For a discussion of bargaining and transactions costs in common property, see Carol M. Rose, 
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 
282–85 (1990).  
221. Merrill, supra note 218, at 19. 
222. LOWE, supra note 1, at 47.  
223. Id. at 311–12.  
224. Id. at 886–87. Injection of produced water to stimulate production is often termed “secondary 
recovery” or specifically “waterflooding.” Id.  
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Enhanced recovery projects usually occur on lands within an oil or gas 
conservation unit formed by the authority of an administrative agency. 
Units ideally encompass significant areas of land embracing the full extent 
of the producing reservoir. Disputes nonetheless arise when injected fluids 
cross unit boundaries and cause valuable minerals to migrate into the unit 
from lands outside of the unit. 
The legal rule governing such disputes is known as the “negative rule 
of capture.” The negative rule of capture permits unit operators to “inject 
into a formation substances which may migrate through the structure to 
the land of others, even if this results in the displacement under such land 
of more valuable with less valuable substances.”225 Courts applying the 
rule justify this result by the social importance of enhanced recovery for 
the prevention of waste of hydrocarbon resources and waste from more 
wells than are necessary to efficiently deplete a reservoir. These cases tend 
to focus on drainage of hydrocarbons from a nonconsenting owner’s 
property rather than unauthorized use of the owner’s pore space.226 As 
with the fluid disposal cases, above, these cases illustrate courts’ tendency 
to call an invasion a trespass while analyzing it like a nuisance. 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel227 is one such case. There an 
unleased landowner sued to set aside a commission order permitting water 
injection for secondary recovery. The landowner asserted that 
encroachment of the injected water into his subsurface would constitute a 
trespass. In holding that the unleased owner may not enjoin any water 
encroachment, the Manziel Court expended significant space in its 
opinion extolling the social value of secondary recovery operations. It 
opined, “[i]t is obvious that secondary recovery programs could not and 
would not be conducted if any adjoining operator [or landowner] could 
stop the project on the ground of subsurface trespass.”228 Balancing this 
consideration with the plaintiff’s property rights, Manziel ultimately held 
that the “rules of ownership are of prime importance, but in this 
consideration the rights of one [the nonconsenting landowner] do not 
exceed the rights of another [the injector].”229 Other courts follow a 
                                                   
225. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962) (quoting HOWARD R. 
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 204.5, at 60.2 (1959)). The negative rule of 
capture is widely followed. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 
204.5 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2018) (collecting cases from numerous 
jurisdictions applying the rule).  
226. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 12, at 272–73.  
227. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).  
228. Id. at 568.  
229. Id. at 572. The Texas Supreme Court in Garza appeared to treat Manziel as authority that no 
trespass whatsoever occurs if water injected pursuant to a Commission-approved secondary recovery 
unit migrates and drains minerals from lands outside the unit. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza 
Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008). It does not appear, however, that Manziel is precedential 
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similar approach and generally find that the public value of enhanced 
recovery justifies any drainage of minerals from 
nonconsenting  landowners.230 
Courts occasionally award compensatory damages in enhanced 
recovery cases. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson,231 the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals permitted plaintiff operators to recover damages to an oil well 
caused by the defendant’s adjoining waterflood.232 The plaintiffs alleged 
the defendant “had injected water at unreasonable and excessive rates in 
wells located along the boundaries” of a lease adjoining plaintiffs’ lease 
“‘and that such injections at such high rates were unreasonable, since the 
injection wells were deliberately located as close as possible to the 
property line and immediately opposite and within less than 100 feet of 
two of the plaintiffs’ wells.’”233 
The court framed the issue on appeal as “by what standards of tort 
liability shall the [defendant’s] conduct be judged, i.e., trespass, nuisance, 
negligence, strict liability, or unreasonable use or disregard of another’s 
property.”234 The Tenth Circuit, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, searched 
Kansas law and found no applicable standard of tort liability for water 
flooding operations. The most apposite case was Polzin v. National 
Cooperative Refinery Association235 in which the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that proof of negligence was not essential to establish a statutory 
cause of action for underground releases of saltwater.236 The Jackson 
Court noted that Oklahoma courts follow a similar approach and that 
Texas rejects absolute liability in favor of a negligence standard. 
Eventually Jackson applied what appears to be a nuisance-like 
standard, even referencing sections of the Restatement of Torts pertaining 
to nuisance.237 Citing Professors Keeton and Jones the court explained: 
[t]hey suggest that orthodox rules and principles applicable to 
surface invasions should not be appropriately applied to 
                                                   
on that point. Three years after Garza, the Texas Supreme Court, in FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. 
Processing Sys., L.C., explained that it held in Manziel that “that Railroad Commission authorization 
of secondary recovery projects are not subject to injunctive relief based on trespass claims.” 351 
S.W.3d 306, 313 (Tex. 2011) (emphasis added). 
230. See, e.g., Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, Syl. ¶ 5 (Kan. 2002) (“To establish a rule which 
prevents importation of water for secondary oil and gas recovery, yet requires additional wells to be 
drilled on the lessor’s premises to produce water for the same purpose, would appear to undermine 
conservation, promote waste, and foster uneconomic actions.”).  
231. 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963), abrogated by Fransen v. Conoco, Inc., 64 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1995). 
232. Id. at 165.  
233. Id. at 163.  
234. Id. at 162.  
235. 266 P.2d 293 (Kan. 1954).  
236. Tidewater Oil Co., 320 F.2d at 162–63 (citing Polzin, 266 P.2d at 297–98).  
237. Id. at 162–63 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826–32 & 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)).  
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subsurface invasions, arising out of operations affected with a 
public interest and involving a weighing of the individual interest 
of the damaged lessee against the social interest involved in the 
production and conservation of crude oil.238 
Jackson ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim “is based upon 
intentional and unreasonable interference with the claimants’ property 
rights, resulting in actual and substantial damages,” and affirmed the trial 
court’s award of lost profits damages for prematurely watering out 
plaintiffs’ wells.239 
Jackson’s analysis is more concerned with the reasonableness of the 
water flooder’s conduct than the type of injury to the plaintiffs’ property 
interest. The latter question is essential in determining liability for 
subsurface interferences. By applying a nuisance-like standard, however, 
Jackson implicitly acknowledges that encroaching water infringes an 
owner’s subsurface property rights only if the conduct causing the 
encroachment unreasonably interferes with the owner’s ability to 
reasonably use the subsurface—which in Jackson meant the owner’s 
ability to produce its existing wells. Relevant considerations in making 
this determination would include the appropriateness of the conduct to the 
locality, the actor’s ability to avoid the harm, and the utility of the actor’s 
conduct. These are factors in a nuisance analysis under the 
Second  Restatement. 
Manziel and Jackson demonstrate the broad trend in enhanced recovery 
cases to privilege physical invasions of property where a strong public 
policy reason exists for the conduct causing the invasion. Jackson 
illustrates that damages may nonetheless be available for injuries caused 
by excessive or unreasonable injection operations even if conducted 
pursuant to a regulatory permit. Few clear standards have emerged in 
these cases and many questions persist: How are courts to weigh the 
relative utility of a given enhanced recovery operation in comparison with 
other subsurface activities competing for primacy in a common reservoir? 
How are they to decide when the operations are conducted in an 
unreasonable manner? Express application of nuisance doctrine would 
guide courts in each of these questions and refine the analysis in 
these  cases. 
C. Natural Gas Storage Cases 
Produced natural gas is frequently injected into subsurface strata for 
temporary storage until winter months when demand for the product is 
                                                   
238. Id. at 163 (citing Keeton & Jones, supra note 71). 
239. Id. at 163–64.  
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high.240 Natural gas storage rights are usually acquired by eminent domain 
under the Natural Gas Act.241 Under the act a storage facility must acquire 
through contract or condemnation the exclusive right to use pore space for 
gas storage.242 Disputes arise in condemnation cases over valuation of the 
strata and pore space to be used for gas storage. In most cases, however, 
it is the condemnation of the exclusive right to exploit the substances 
native to the pore space in the condemned area, and not the value of the 
strata and pore space itself, that drives the valuation question.243 
Claims of trespass occur when injected gas migrates from a certificated 
storage field into the subsurface strata of offsetting owners.244 Because 
natural gas storage rights are typically obtained through use or threat of 
condemnation, courts tend to treat claims of trespass arising from the 
migration of injected natural gas from a storage facility as actions in 
inverse condemnation.245 Moreover, because gas has a market value, most 
of the natural gas storage cases focus on ownership of the stored gas rather 
than the invasion that occurs when injected gas strays from the confines 
of the storage facility.246 
Courts generally do not award compensation for unauthorized use of 
pore space for gas storage absent a showing of interference with use of 
the property. Although widely criticized, some courts follow Hammonds 
v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,247 which held that escaped natural 
gas from a storage facility did not trespass on the plaintiff’s subsurface 
because the gas storage company had abandoned the gas when it 
escaped.248 Other jurisdictions have rejected Hammonds’s reasoning in 
                                                   
240. ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp. 2d 933, 937 (W.D. Mich. 2006).  
241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (Supp. 2012). The act permits private natural gas companies to obtain 
certificates of public convenience empowering them to condemn private property for constructing 
underground natural gas storage facilities. Id.  
242. Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 725.  
243. Id. at 724 (“[D]isputes may arise over the valuation of the storage space, but it is well settled 
that compensation must be paid when the exclusive right to protect the storage strata by condemning 
all other exploitation of the strata and its contents is acquired by the natural gas company.”). 
244. Id. at 724–25.  
245. Id. at 730.  
246. Id.  
247. 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934). Hammonds analogized stored natural gas to captured wild animals 
to hold that “if in fact the gas turned loose in the earth wandered into the plaintiff’s land, the defendant 
is not liable to her for the value of the use of her property, for the company ceased to be the exclusive 
owner of the whole of the gas—it again became mineral faere naturae” and again subject to capture. 
Id. at 206. 
248. For example, the Hammonds doctrine applies in Kansas when a person uses the subsurface of 
another to store natural gas without authority or compensation and no natural gas public utility is 
involved and no certificate authorizing a natural gas storage facility has been issued. Anderson v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp. 699 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1985). Notably, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
applied Hammonds-like logic in West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, a case 
involving disposal of produced water, where it held there was no liability for migration of injected 
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favor of finding that escaped storage gas remains the property of the 
storage company. But few cases in non-Hammond jurisdictions have 
squarely addressed whether the escape of storage gas into a nonconsenting 
owner’s pore space constitutes a trespass or a taking.249 
Rejecting Hammonds a Michigan federal court stated in ANR Pipeline 
Co. v. 60 Acres of Land250 that “if injected gas moves across boundaries 
there may be a trespass,” and if the intrusion was caused by a gas storage 
company with condemnation authority the invasion may furnish a basis 
for a claim of inverse condemnation.251 The court, however, distinguished 
intrusions of native “cushion” gas, which is displaced from the storage 
facility by injection of storage gas, because it is not foreign to the 
reservoir.252 The court held that no compensation is due for use of pore 
space to store cushion gas unless the claimant can show some harm, such 
as interference with use of the property.253 
ANR Pipeline did not analyze whether use of another’s pore space 
without permission to store natural gas would constitute an actionable 
trespass. The case nonetheless illustrates courts’ reluctance to consider the 
underground movement of fluids to be physical intrusions and their 
tendency to award compensation only where the plaintiff proves 
impairment of use. The only compensable injury a subsurface owner 
suffers by the condemnation of reservoir space for gas storage or intrusion 
by injected or displaced gas is an interference with use of the property. 
There is no compensable injury for loss of possession. 
This point was made explicitly by the Sixth Circuit in Baatz v. 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC.254 Following Chance v. BP Chemicals, 
Inc.,255 Baatz denied landowners’ claims of trespass and unjust 
enrichment against Columbia for storing natural gas under their land 
without permission or a condemnation order.256 Absent a showing of 
actual or foreseeable use of the subsurface, Baatz held, the landowners 
                                                   
saltwater, in part because “[u]nder all the authorities we have been able to find upon the subject, the 
assumption that the salt water remained the property of defendants after it permeated or penetrated 
into the . . . formation underlying the land of plaintiffs is incorrect.” 226 P.2d 965, 970 (Okla. 1950).  
249. See generally Gresham & Anderson, supra note 31, at 723–33 (surveying natural gas storage 
cases touching on trespass issues).  
250. 418 F. Supp. 2d 933 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
251. Id. at 940. 
252. Id.  
253. Id. at 941.  
254. 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019). 
255. See supra section IV.A.  
256. Baatz, 929 F.3d at 773, 777. 
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could not establish that the gas storage violated a possessory interest or 
entitled them to restitution.257 
D. Tunneling and Directional Drilling Cases 
This section discusses cases involving various forms of tunneling under 
nonconsenting owners’ land. For present purposes “tunneling” includes 
drilling oil or gas wells. The tunneling cases discussed below indicate 
courts are unwilling to compensate a landowner for the mere presence of 
an unauthorized tunnel or wellbore. Claimants must show interference 
with use or enjoyment of the surface or minerals in the property to justify 
relief. Since courts in these cases already treat them as nontrespassory in 
nature, applying a nuisance analysis would rationalize the results and 
furnish a reasoned approach to determining when a plaintiff’s lost use 
value justifies compensation. 
1. Tunnels Not for Oil and Gas Purposes 
Early cases reached mixed results on whether tunneling beneath private 
property without permission violates the owner’s subsurface rights. While 
some courts appeared to consider subsurface property as fully possessory 
as surface property, others, like New York courts, did not. In Boehringer 
v. Montalto258 the New York Supreme Court explained that “the title of 
an owner of the soil will not be extended to a depth below ground beyond 
which the owner may not reasonably make use thereof,” and concluded 
that a proposed 150-foot deep sewer was beyond this point.259 Likewise, 
in In re Tunnel Street in New York, the court held, 
[t]he effect of the improvement contemplated in this proceeding 
is to take a tunnel through appellants’ property 150 feet below the 
surface. It will not restrict the superficial area of the property[,] 
or in any way interfere with its improvement or development. 
Save for the bore taken for the tunnel[,] the appellants will own 
their property as absolutely as they now own it. . . . The 
appellants’ claim for damage . . . impresses us as unsubstantial 
and fanciful, with no sound basis to rest upon.260 
                                                   
257. Id. at 777. For a case affirming an award of damages for trespass and unjust enrichment on 
similar facts, see Beck v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Kansas law).  
258. 254 N.Y.S. 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931).  
259. Id. at 278; see also In re Gillespie, 17 N.Y.S.2d 560, 563–64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (regarding 
a tunnel buried 470 to 500 feet deep). 
260. 144 N.Y.S. 1002, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913), aff’d, 106 N.E. 1043 (N.Y. 1914).  
 
13 Schremmer.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:44 PM 
2020] GETTING PAST POSSESSION 359 
 
Compare the New York tunneling cases with Smith v. City of Atlanta,261 
where the Georgia Supreme Court applied the ad coelum doctrine to the 
subsurface.262 Smith found the city’s tunneling under the plaintiff’s lot did 
not affect the lot’s market value but nonetheless held it constituted a 
taking of the plaintiff’s property.263 In its brief reasoning Smith explains 
that ad coelum applies “upwards as well as downwards” such that “[a]ll 
the earth removed belonged to the plaintiffs, and unquestionably by the 
location of the sewer they were deprived of the possession of space it 
occupied, and could no longer use that space for any other purpose.”264 
The plaintiff alleged loss of income from selling sand from the area where 
the tunnel was dug. The court criticized the plaintiffs’ allegations as 
“imperfectly drawn” but held that “a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for 
some amount—certainly for at least nominal damages—was demanded 
by the evidence.”265 The court ultimately reversed the lower court’s denial 
of a new trial on the proper amount of compensation and remanded the 
case for determination of the lost use  value. 
Similarly the city in City of Chicago v. Troy Laundry Machine 
Company266 was held liable for trespass for digging a tunnel fifty-five feet 
below the surface of property without the owner’s knowledge.267 When 
the owner constructed a building on the property six years later, water 
flowing through the city’s tunnel eroded the soil and caused the building 
to sink. The court stated that both the tunnel’s original construction and 
the water flowing through the tunnel constituted trespasses but noted the 
building of the tunnel was “a mere historic incident in the case.”268 The 
court ultimately upheld the plaintiff’s verdict for damages caused by the 
erosion of the surface. 
Early commentators grappled with the contrariety in these and other 
early subsurface use cases. Certain decisions, including Smith and Troy 
Laundry Machine, prompted one scholar to remark in 1927 that the 
subsurface appears to be “something which can be owned, and is owned, 
subject, of course, to the limitations imposed by our modes of life . . . .”269 
This characterization did not account for the New York cases finding no 
compensable property interest in the subsurface. Moreover, neither Smith 
                                                   
261. 17 S.E. 981 (Ga. 1893). 
262. Id.  
263. Id. Sy. ¶ 1.   
264. Id. at 981.  
265. Id.  
266. 162 F. 678 (7th Cir. 1908). 
267. Id.  
268. Id. at 679. For other older cases finding trespass liability for subsurface invasions see the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1969).  
269. Ball, supra note 68, at 689.  
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nor Troy Laundry Machine holds that subsurface tunneling interferes with 
the surface owner’s possessory right in the subsurface. Although Smith 
appears to hold that the plaintiff was entitled at least to nominal damages 
for the sewer tunnel under his property, the case was ultimately remanded 
for a new trial on the value of the plaintiff’s surface uses impaired by the 
tunneling. And although Troy Laundry Machine states the mere digging 
of the tunnel was a trespass, this statement was not necessary to the 
disposition of the case, which was decided based on the plaintiff’s lost use 
value in the surface and building as a result of the tunnel.270 
These cases show that early courts agreed surface ownership includes 
a negative right to be free from subsurface interferences that inhibit use of 
the surface.271 Subsurface tunneling is compensable when it violates the 
surface owner’s negative right (as in Smith and Troy Laundry Machine) 
and is not when it does not (as in the New York cases). Synthesizing the 
cases this way leads to a conclusion, similar to Dean Wigmore’s, that the 
subsurface is akin to an incorporeal appurtenance of the surface. 
2. Slant-Hole and Directional Wellbores 
Drillers sometimes deviate or slant boreholes to produce minerals from 
a portion of reservoir not directly beneath the surface location of the well. 
Unscrupulous drillers do so with the intent of bottoming the producing 
portion of a well under neighboring property to surreptitiously produce oil 
or gas from their neighbor’s land.272 Affected subsurface owners typically 
sue slant-hole drillers for two causes of action: trespass and conversion of 
the oil or gas. As California Court of Appeals in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. 
v. Bell View Oil Syndicate273 explained in one such slant-hole trespass and 
conversion case, “[w]e do not need to discuss the injury to the real estate, 
as these actions are not based upon damages suffered to the real estate but 
are based upon the wrongful conversion of oil, gas, and other 
hydrocarbons from beneath the property.”274 
                                                   
270. City of Chi. v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 162 F. 678 (7th Cir. 1908).  
271. Even the New York holdings leave room for a takings claim for underground tunneling if it 
would interfere with the development of the surface. See In re Tunnel St. in N.Y., 144 N.Y.S. 1002, 
1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913), aff’d, 106 N.E. 1043 (N.Y. 1914).   
272. See generally Mortimer Kline, Subsurface Trespassing, 5 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 30 (1939) 
(describing the problem as a matter of trespass and conversion); Note, Suing a Slant-Driller for 
Subsurface Trespass or Drainage, 15 STAN. L. REV. 665, 680 (1963) (describing the issue and noting 
that slant-hole invasions appear to be the earliest subsurface trespass cases arising in the oil and gas 
industry).  
273. 76 P.2d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).  
274. Id. at 175. 
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Many slant-hole cases also involve requests for injunction. In Union 
Oil of California v. Domengeaux,275 Union Oil sued to enjoin 
Domengeaux from operating a deviated well located on the surface of 
Domengeaux’s land but that had been completed under Union Oil’s 
lease.276 Before Domengeaux commenced drilling, Union Oil warned him 
not to “cause or permit said well to cross or be within the boundary lines 
of” Union Oil’s lease.277 Domengeaux ignored the warning and drilled 
the  deviated well. 
Union Oil sued for injunctive relief and damages but abandoned its 
damages claim at trial because of the difficulty in proving where the 
produced oil originated.278 The appellate court upheld an order enjoining 
Domengeaux to plug back the well to a bottom-hole location within 
Domengeaux’s lease boundaries even though Union Oil showed no actual 
damages. “Before leaving the point,” however, the court stated, 
we do not wish to be understood as holding that every subsurface 
trespass in the drilling of an oil well would warrant injunctive 
relief. We can conceive of an oil well deviating slightly from the 
perpendicular, trespassing to a small extent upon the land of an 
adjoining owner and returning to oil-producing strata within the 
property of the owner of the well. In such case, the damage, if 
any, to the adjoining owners might be said to be wholly 
inconsequential and equitable relief might be 
properly  withheld.279 
As in the non-oil and gas tunneling cases, liability in slant-hole well cases 
depends on the loss of the property’s available economic use—production 
of valuable minerals—and not on the physical invasion of the plaintiff’s 
subsurface by defendant’s wellbore. Subsurface intrusions by deviated 
wellbores must not be trespassory invasions because they are not 
actionable unless they also deprive the subsurface owner of the economic 
value of underlying mineral reserves. 
The nontrespassory nature of nonproducing wellbores is further 
illustrated by the recent Texas Supreme Court case of Lightning Oil Co. 
v. Anadarko E&P OnShore, LLC.280 Lightning Oil involved a dispute over 
use of a common reservoir for oil and gas production between Lightning 
and Anadarko. Lightning owned an oil and gas lease covering the Briscoe 
                                                   
275. 86 P.2d 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).  
276. Id. at 128.  
277. Id. at 129.  
278. Id. at 130.  
279. Id.  
280. 520 S.W.3d 39, 49 (Tex. 2017).  
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Ranch.281 Anadarko owned an oil and gas lease on adjoining property that 
strictly limited use of the surface for drilling.282 Anadarko obtained the 
permission of the surface owner of the Briscoe Ranch to drill horizontal 
wellbores from a location on the Ranch to produce from its adjoining 
leasehold.283 Anadarko did not intend to produce along any portion of the 
wellbores under the Ranch.284 Lightning nevertheless objected to 
Anadarko’s drilling anywhere under the Ranch and sued for trespass, 
tortious interference, and injunction.285 
The Texas Supreme Court declared the surface owner “owns all 
nonmineral ‘molecules’ of the land, i.e., the mass that undergirds the 
surface,”286 as well as the “reservoir [storage] space”287 under the surface. 
It further stated that an oil and gas lessee owns the right to develop 
associated with the severed mineral estate, which it described as “the 
exclusive right to appropriate [the minerals],”288 but does not own the 
“right to possess the specific place or space where the minerals are 
located.”289 From these principles the court reasoned that “an 
unauthorized interference with the place where the minerals are located 
constitutes a trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference 
infringes on the mineral lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.”290 The court 
ultimately held that Lightning failed to offer sufficient proof that 
Anadarko’s proposed well sites, drilling activities, and underground well 
structures would interfere with surface and subsurface spaces necessary 
for Lightning to develop the minerals.291 The court further held that any 
minerals lost as a result of Anadarko’s drilling through the subsurface 
were outweighed by the interests of the public in maximizing recovery of 
oil and gas.292 
Contrast Lightning Oil with Chevron Oil Company v. Howell293 where 
Chevron appealed from a temporary injunction restraining it from drilling 
                                                   
281. Id. at 43.  
282. Id. 
283. Id.  
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 46 (first quoting Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 480 S.W.3d 628, 
633–35 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015), and then quoting Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park 
Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 441 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
287. Id. (first quoting Lightning Oil Co., 480 S.W.3d at 633–35, then quoting West, 480 S.W.3d at  815. 
288. Id. at 47–48 (quoting Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 293–94 (Tex. 
1923)). 
289. Id. at 49.  
290. Id. (emphasis added). 
291. Id.  
292. Id. at 51.  
293. 407 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).  
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a directional well through a subsurface tract to access minerals it leased 
under Lake Texoma.294 Chevron argued that its directional wellbore did 
not interfere with the rights of the mineral lessee in the subsurface tract 
and should not be enjoined. The court disagreed based on testimony of 
Chevron’s superintendent that “any time you drill into something there is 
bound to be some damage.”295 
It is difficult to reconcile Lightning Oil with the slant-hole well cases 
and Howell under a trespass analysis. Whereas in the slant-hole well cases 
the loss of minerals resulting from an intruding wellbore is compensable, 
the court in Lightning Oil declined to award Lightning damages for loss 
of minerals. And whereas in Howell the potential for damage to the 
mineral lessee’s ability to exploit its interest was sufficient to enjoin 
Chevron’s plans for a horizontal wellbore, in Lightning Oil Anadarko was 
permitted to drill its horizontal wellbores even though Lightning showed 
it would lose some use of its mineral interest as a result. 
These cases are reconcilable under a utility-balancing nuisance 
analysis. Under nuisance, the destruction or drainage of minerals by an 
intruding wellbore would be compensable if the gravity of the harm to the 
nonconsenting owner (likely measurable by lost production) outweighs 
the utility of drilling the wellbore to the defendant driller and the public. 
Within this framework a slant-hole driller like Domengeaux would have 
to show a compelling societal need to produce the well bottomed under 
Union Oil’s lease to justify the serious loss of minerals Union Oil is likely 
to suffer as a result. Alternatively, under nuisance’s compensation 
principle, Union Oil’s loss of minerals may be so severe that no balancing 
is necessary. It is clear from the court’s opinion in Domengeaux, however, 
that there was no justification for Domengeaux’s actions that would 
counterbalance Union Oil’s inevitable losses. Injunction was 
therefore  appropriate. 
In Lightning Oil, on the other hand, the utility of Anadarko’s horizontal 
drilling operation was high. It was necessary to produce minerals that 
Anadarko was entitled to under its lease but otherwise could not access 
because of the lease’s surface use restrictions. The harm to Lightning’s 
ability to exploit its mineral interest was not significant in comparison 
since it had no plans to develop the portion of the property where 
Anadarko would drill and the amount of recoverable oil or gas that would 
be lost by the wellbore would be quite small. By permitting Anadarko to 
drill through the necessary portion of Lightning’s mineral estate the 
Lightning Oil Court coordinated use of the subsurface of the Briscoe 
Ranch to maximize efficiency of its use. 
                                                   
294. Id. at 526.  
295. Id. at 528.  
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Viewed as nuisance cases, Lightning Oil is also distinguishable from 
Howell based on the relative harm-to-utility ratio presented in each case. 
In Howell, Chevron’s superintendent admitted the directional wellbore 
would damage the nonconsenting mineral owner’s reservoir. But unlike 
Anadarko in Lightning Oil, Chevron apparently failed to raise any 
argument to justify the damage. Chevron urged instead that its directional 
wellbore would not interfere at all with the nonconsenting owner’s 
mineral interest. Under a utilitarian nuisance analysis these cases are 
distinguishable based on the strength of the evidence of the utility of 
the  interfering conduct. 
E. Hydraulic Fracturing Cases 
Hydraulically fracturing (fracking) a well creates artificial fractures in 
reservoir rock to increase permeability and stimulate its productive 
capacity. Fracking involves pumping fluid and proppants into the 
wellbore under immense pressure. The resulting fractures, called “frac 
fissures,” can radiate hundreds of feet laterally from the wellbore, even 
travelling beyond property lines to fracture rock and deposit fluid and 
proppants in the subsurface of another.296 The high pressures created by 
frac jobs can also flow through frac fissures and interfere with existing 
wellbores on other property.297 This problem, called “frac hits,” most 
commonly occurs where a newly drilled horizontal well is hydraulically 
fractured in a field where vertical wells already produce.298 Some state 
regulatory agencies have promulgated planning requirements for newly 
fractured wells as a means of avoiding frac hits.299 For the most part, 
                                                   
296. Frac fissures are typically thousands of feet in length but their effective length is frequently 
less than one hundred feet long. The “effective length” of a frac fissure is the portion that actually 
drains hydrocarbons from the reservoir into the wellbore. The “propped length” of a frac fissure is the 
portion that is held open by the proppants pumped in the fracturing treatment. The propped length is 
usually much greater than the effective length. Greater still is the “hydraulic length” which is the 
farthest extent of the fracturing fluids not including proppants. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza 
Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2008).  
297. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal & Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128, 16,181–
16,182 (Mar. 26, 2015) (defining this phenomenon as, the “unplanned interconnectivity of wells 
during a hydraulic fracturing operation though the underground formations between the well 
undergoing a fracturing operation and an existing well”). 
298. See Pierce, supra note 43, at 264; see, e.g., Max Oil Co. v. Range Prod. Co., 681 F. App’x 
710, 711–12 (10th Cir. 2017) (dismissing as untimely claims of negligence, trespass, nuisance, and 
conversion brought by a vertical well operator against a horizontal well operator based on damage 
alleged to have occurred to the plaintiff’s vertical well as a result of the defendant’s fracturing of its 
horizontal well). Nonetheless, frac hits can occur wherever two wells are in close proximity and 
opened to the same reservoir. Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 12-2.  
299. E.g., COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, INTERIM STATEWIDE HORIZONTAL OFFSET 
POLICY,  at  1  (Feb.  10, 2014), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Policies/ 
InterimStatewideHorizontalOffsetPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QP2-6N4J].  
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however, the risk of frac hits is dealt with by cooperative bargaining or 
litigation among operators within a common reservoir.300 
Fracturing operations are thus ripe for litigation in two relevant 
categories of circumstances: when frac fissures, fluids, and proppants 
cross property lines and drain minerals from another’s subsurface, and 
when frac pressures communicate across property lines and interfere with 
production from existing wells. As examined below, courts’ classification 
of such invasions as trespassory or nontrespassory varies widely. Such 
disputes may be resolved efficiently and equitably by a nuisance analysis. 
1. Fracking Resulting in Drainage 
When frac fissures, fluids, and proppants extend past the boundaries of 
the owner’s land and into adjoining land the issue arises whether any 
hydrocarbons drained from the adjoining land become the property of the 
fracking owner under the rule of capture. In considering this question 
courts have applied a trespass analysis based on the ad coelum doctrine’s 
definition of surface and subsurface ownership as modified by the rule of 
capture. Under the rule of capture, any hydrocarbons drained from 
adjoining land by a well located within the ad coelum-defined surface and 
subsurface boundaries of the well owner’s land and produced in 
compliance with conservation laws are the well owner’s legitimate 
property.301 If, in contrast, a well is drilled and bottomed in the subsurface 
of another’s land, “the driller has committed a trespass,” and any 
hydrocarbons produced by the well’s owner are illegitimate and not 
privileged under the rule of capture.302 Consequently hydraulic fracturing 
precedent focuses on whether cross-boundary frac fissures and proppants 
constitute a trespass. 303 
                                                   
300. See Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 12-10–12-11 (describing the informal and 
voluntary process by which operators intending to complete fracking operations consult operators of 
proximate vertical wells to resolve potential issues arising from frac hits). 
301. See 1 KUNTZ, supra note 54, at 325–26 (“Such [capture] right must, however, be exercised by 
operations within the vertical boundaries of the owner’s tract of land. If a well is drilled in such a 
manner that it is bottomed under the land of another, the driller has committed a trespass.”); accord 
Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938); Wronski 
v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 571 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that “any violation of a proration 
order constitutes conversion of oil from the pool, and subjects the violator to liability to all the owners 
of interests in the pool for conversion of the illegally-obtained oil” (internal citations omitted)).  
302. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 54, at 325–26.  
303. Despite arising decades ago this question has only recently been directly litigated. A trio of 
older Texas cases, which did not address the question squarely, appeared to presume that fracturing 
under the property of another would constitute a trespass and thus that any drainage of hydrocarbons 
from the fissures would not be protected by the rule of capture. See Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee 
Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes, 344 S.W.2d 
421 (Tex. 1961); Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).  
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In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court held in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Garza Energy Trust304 that a subsurface invasion by frac fissures was not 
an actionable trespass and permitted the fracking party to retain 
hydrocarbons drained from the plaintiffs’ adjoining lands.305 Coastal 
owned the oil and gas lease on Share 13 and also owned the fee mineral 
interest in the adjoining Share 12. The Salinas parties were the lessors 
under Coastal’s lease on Share 13 and thus owned the possibility of 
reverter in the minerals. Coastal fracked a well on Share 12 to produce 
natural gas from the Vicksburg T formation underlying both Share 12 and 
Share 13. The parties agreed both the hydraulic and propped lengths of 
the fractures traveled under Share 13; they did not agree whether the 
effective length did.306 Upset the fractures might drain natural gas from 
Share 13 and deprive them of royalties on the drained gas, the Salinas 
parties sued for trespass. The court denied the Salinas parties relief finding 
that Coastal had a right to drain hydrocarbons from the Salinas parties’ 
tract under the rule of capture.307 
Because the Salinas parties had granted Coastal an oil and gas lease on 
Share 13, under Texas law the Salinas parties owned only a future interest 
in the mineral estate—a possibility of reverter. Since future interests are 
nonpossessory the Salinas parties could not state a claim for trespass 
quare clausum fregit and could proceed only under a claim for trespass 
on the case. Unlike trespass quare clausum fregit trespass on the case 
requires a showing of actual damages.308 The only damages claimed by 
the Salinas parties consisted of drainage of natural gas from Share 13 to 
Coastal’s well on Share 12. The Garza Court ultimately held that any 
drainage damages would be precluded by the rule of capture. Since the 
Salinas parties needed to show damages for their trespass cause of action, 
they could not articulate an actionable trespass. 
Writing for the dissent Justice Johnson criticized the majority for not 
determining whether the extension of frac fissures into a nonconsenting 
owner’s property constitutes a trespass in the first instance, noting that the 
rule of capture would not apply to permit an operator to drain a neighbor’s 
hydrocarbons by trespassory conduct.309 The dissent then analogized frac 
fissures to deviated wellbores that are intentionally bottomed in another’s 
land and reasoned that, like deviated wells, frac fissures would constitute 
a trespass under Texas precedent. 
                                                   
304. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
305. Id.  
306. Id. at 7.   
307. Id. at 13–15.  
308. Id. at 9–11.  
309. Id. at 42–44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).  
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The Garza majority cited four justifications for finding no “actionable 
trespass.” Each justification turns on the public policy rationale that 
hydraulic fracturing should be promoted because it prevents waste by 
enabling production of tight reservoirs, like the Vicksburg T, that would 
otherwise be unproductive.310 In concurrence Justice Willett wrote that he 
would extend these policy justifications to hold that trespasses-by-frac are 
no trespass at all based on the social value of increasing production of oil 
and gas through hydraulic fracturing.311 Per Willett, “Balancing the 
respective interests [of the industry and society as a whole and of the 
plaintiffs’  particular  interests,] . . . this  type  of  subsurface 
encroachment . . . simply isn’t wrongful and thus isn’t a trespass at all, not 
just a nonactionable trespass.”312 
The Garza majority’s balancing of public policy reasons for and 
against establishing liability for the invasion is akin to nuisance law’s 
balance of utilities test, not to the property rule of trespass. Despite 
framing the issue as whether the encroachment of frac fissures is a 
trespass, Garza approached the case much as a court would in determining 
a nuisance case.313 Yet, because Garza assumed any invasion would be 
trespassory, it lacked the articulable standards of nuisance for striking an 
efficient and equitable balance between the parties’ conflicting interests 
in use of the subsurface. Garza instead engaged in an ad hoc public 
policy  analysis. 
Courts outside of Texas have not followed Garza. In Stone v. 
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC314 the Northern District of West Virginia, 
on facts similar to those in Garza, reaffirmed the ad coelum doctrine and 
the traditional standard for trespass liability.315 The Stone Court held that 
frac fissures travelling under a nonconsenting owner’s land constitute an 
actionable trespass and therefore that drainage through cross-boundary 
frac fissures is not privileged under the rule of capture.316 In so holding, 
Stone rejected the Garza majority’s analysis, adopting instead Justice 
Johnson’s reasoning, and added that Garza placed “the desires of the 
                                                   
310. Id. at 16–17. 
311. Id. at 29.  
312. Id. at 30. 
313. See, e.g., Cyr v. Town of Brookfield, 216 A.2d 198, 200–01 (Conn. 1965) (reversing the trial 
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim of nuisance against a municipality for its operation of a sewer 
system on the basis that factfinding is necessary to determine whether under the balance of utilities 
test the municipality’s invasion of the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the land outweighed the utility 
of the municipality’s conduct (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW 
INST.  1969)).  
314. No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013). 
315. Id.   
316. Id. at *7–8.  
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industry” over “the property rights of small landowners” who would be 
drained by off-lease fracturing even if they did not consent to drilling or 
production on their land.317 
An intermediate-level appellate court in Pennsylvania also found that 
cross-boundary frac fissures constitute a trespassory invasion of a 
nonconsenting owner’s property in Briggs v. Southwestern Energy 
Production Co.318 Like Stone, Briggs held that the rule of capture does not 
preclude an action for drainage damages from unauthorized frac fissures. 
Briggs’s analysis focused on the unique characteristics of the tight shale 
gas reservoir at issue. Unlike in conventional oil and gas reservoirs, the 
court explained, gas trapped in tight shales is nonmigratory in nature and 
does not escape to adjoining land absent application of external, non-
natural forces like fracking. By this reasoning Briggs concluded the rule 
of capture does not apply to capture of hydrocarbons through cross-
boundary frac fissures in the same way it applies to capture through 
conventional means of production.319 
The threshold question in trespass-by-frac cases is whether the entry of 
a frac fissure into the subsurface of another violates a statute or regulation 
or infringes the other’s property rights. If so, the rule of capture should 
not apply and any drainage occasioned by the cross-boundary frac fissures 
should not be privileged.320 Garza, Stone, and Briggs illustrate the 
difficulty in making the threshold determination under a one-size-fits-all 
rule that every cross-boundary frac fissure is or is not a trespass. Under 
Garza a cross-boundary frac fissure may never be an actionable tort, 
which may disadvantage small-tract owners in favor of broader public 
interests even where it may not serve equity or public policy to do so. In 
contrast jurisdictions following Briggs or Stone may reach socially 
disadvantageous results by subordinating the importance of fracking and 
                                                   
317. Id. at *6–7. 
318. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153, 163–64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (holding that 
hydraulic fracturing does not alter the operation of the rule of capture, and that liability for drainage 
caused by hydraulic fracturing, if at all, would be predicated on a showing that hydraulic fractures 
physically invade the plaintiff’s subsurface), vacated and remanded by No. 63-MAP-2018, 2020 WL 
355911 (Pa. Jan. 22, 2020). 
319. Id. at 162–63. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted review on the following issue: 
Does the rule of capture apply to oil and gas produced from wells that were completed using 
hydraulic fracturing and preclude trespass liability for allegedly draining oil or gas from under 
nearby property, where the well is drilled solely on and beneath the driller’s own property and 
the hydraulic fracturing fluids are injected solely on or beneath the driller’s own property? Briggs 
v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 197 A.3d 1168 (Table) (2018). 
320. See People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 59–61 (Ind. 1892) (holding that the rule of capture 
does not privilege conduct that would otherwise constitute a common law tort such as nuisance); 
Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that drainage in violation 
of conservation statutes is not privileged under the rule of capture and constitutes conversion).  
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efficient hydrocarbon production in favor of the rights of small-tract 
owners in every case. 
Liability for frac invasions is better determined on a flexible, case-by-
case basis under nuisance. The outcomes in frac invasion cases will vary 
under a utilitarian nuisance standard depending on the relative utility of 
the frac operations at issue and the gravity of the harm to, and utility of, 
the plaintiff’s subsurface activities—all in the context of the character of 
the local reservoir.321 Courts already consider the relative importance of 
the parties’ competing subsurface activities to determine liability in 
fracking cases. However, the holdings in Garza, Briggs, and Stone fail to 
acknowledge that a balancing test is inappropriate for determining breach 
of a party’s right of possession. Interest- or utility-balancing is only 
appropriate, if ever, instead for resolving clashes of discordant use 
of  common property. 
The hydraulic fracturing cases are doctrinally inconsistent because they 
misidentify the primary property right at stake, which is the right of use 
and not possession. Because the courts have couched the question in terms 
of whether a frac invasion is a trespass (as opposed to nuisance) their 
holdings do not easily accommodate differing results in cases involving 
unique facts. On the contrary if a cross-boundary frac fissure breaches the 
affected owner’s possessory interest in one case, it should be a breach in 
every case. Many of the factual variables that make frac invasion cases 
difficult are easier to reconcile under a nuisance framework. Treating frac 
invasions as nuisances would permit courts greater flexibility to consider 
factors like reservoir characteristics and the commonness of hydraulic 
fracturing within the reservoir in determining the appropriateness of the 
operations to the character of the area. 
Nuisance principles also provide a framework for evaluating the 
potential harmfulness of a frac invasion to a plaintiff’s interest. For 
instance, if the effective length of a frac fissure crosses into a 
nonconsenting owner’s land, it would be likelier to cause severe harm 
through drainage than if only the propped length (which does not cause 
drainage) crosses the property line. Under a true trespass analysis both 
fissures would be equally invasive and actionable. Under a nuisance 
analysis, in contrast, the gravity of the invasion would depend on the 
likelihood of the fracture to cause drainage. Whether any resulting 
drainage is privileged under the rule of capture would depend on whether 
                                                   
321. When the generic type of dispute in these cases is properly framed as being between competing 
uses of property, the fact that courts in different places at different times resolve similar cases 
differently becomes reconcilable doctrinally. See Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One’s Own 
Property as a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 383, 402 & nn.88–90 
(1917) (noting in his discussion of the then-present state of nuisance law that “[t]he question of 
superiority between two modes of user may be, and has been, decided differently in the same state 
at  different dates”). 
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the severity of the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the utility of the 
defendant’s actions. If so the rule of capture would not apply, and the 
drainage would be compensable. 
By properly identifying the property right at stake—the right of use and 
enjoyment—and applying the appropriate remedial legal regime—
nuisance—it is possible to achieve doctrinal consistency across and within 
jurisdictions. Even if the results in these cases would not change if 
analyzed as a nuisance, properly framing the nature of the invasion and 
applying the corresponding tort regime would harmonize the disparate 
results and lend coherence to the area of law. 
2. Frac Hits 
There does not yet appear to be an appellate case addressing the merits 
of a frac-hit dispute.322 Mark Christiansen and Professor David Pierce 
have sketched the paradigm frac-hit dispute as follows: 
[A]ssume a reservoir owner desires to drill a horizontal well in a 
reservoir containing an existing vertical well. The horizontal well 
developer is concerned about avoiding or minimizing any 
interwellbore communication with an offsetting vertical well. 
Assume the remedy is to shut in the vertical well while the 
horizontal well is undergoing hydraulic fracturing. Suppose the 
vertical well owner (1) refuses to shut in, (2) demands 
compensation for lost revenue during the shut-in period, or 
(3) asserts damage to the well or the reservoir. How will these 
issues be resolved?323 
Frac hits pose basic resource allocation questions: where two operators 
desire to produce oil or gas from a common reservoir by conflicting 
means, one by a preexisting vertical well and the other by a newly fracked 
horizontal well, which means of production should prevail? Which 
operator’s property rights entitle it to produce by its preferred means?324 
Trespass would be a poor analytical tool for resolving these issues 
because, as illustrated by Garza, Briggs, and Stone, it imposes a strict, 
absolute-liability-or-nothing standard despite the unique circumstances of 
a given case. Moreover, a trespass analysis would focus on the physical 
or nonphysical nature of the intrusion, which sheds little light in a 
competition between nonpossessory use rights. Nor would a trespass 
                                                   
322. See Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 12–11 (“A number of low-profile lawsuits have 
been filed by vertical well operators against operators of new horizontal wells alleging that the 
plaintiff’s vertical well was damaged as a result of a frac job. Currently, the authors are not aware of 
any frac hit lawsuits that have resulted in any substantive law rulings.”). 
323. Pierce, supra note 43, at 265. 
324. See id. at 265 (proposing a reservoir community analysis for resolving the legal question).  
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analysis leave room for consideration of any characteristics of the 
geologic reservoir. A court applying trespass would first determine 
whether the invasion was sufficiently physically intrusive to constitute a 
trespass. Unlike in most drainage-by-frac cases where fractures and 
proppants enter the plaintiff’s property, the intruding agent in most frac 
hits cases is likely to be pressure. Courts following the dimensional test 
might not find this to be a physical intrusion, whereas courts that have 
adopted the reasoning of Martin v. Reynolds probably would.325 Trespass 
analysis may render opposite results in these two types of jurisdictions 
even where the underlying reservoir-use conflict is the same in both. 
Even a modified trespass rule that privileges socially valuable physical 
intrusions may not render consistent outcomes, because frac hits cases 
involve two competing methods of exploiting the minerals in a 
reservoir—vertical and horizontal production—whose relative values will 
vary depending on reservoir characteristics and market conditions. This 
differs from the typical trespass-by-frac case, which presents a single 
method of mineral development set against the complaining owner’s 
nonuse of the minerals. Consider Garza, where the societal value of 
fracking unconventional reservoirs justified infringement of the 
nonconsenting reservoir owners’ property rights. In Garza the 
nonconsenting owners did not assert that their nonuse of the reservoir was 
better suited to developing the reservoir. In a typical frac-hit case, in 
contrast, both parties would be putting the reservoir to productive uses 
and would likely offer countervailing reasons their respective production 
techniques should prevail. Courts in these cases will be asked to evaluate 
the competing production techniques and the characteristics of the 
reservoir to determine the development scheme most likely to maximize 
efficient exploitation of the common reservoir. 
Nuisance is the appropriate standard for making these kinds of 
evaluations. In considering the paradigm frac hits case a court applying 
utilitarian nuisance framework would start by determining the nature of 
the first-in-time vertical well operator’s injury. The harm suffered by the 
vertical well operator from the horizontal well operator’s frac job may be 
physical damage to the vertical well, diminished production from the 
vertical well, or having to completely shut in the vertical well. The harm 
in each case is interference with the vertical operator’s ability to produce 
its portion of the common reservoir through its vertical well. This is a loss 
of the reservoir’s use value to the operator. It does not matter whether the 
loss of use was caused by a physical intrusion, as by proppants, or merely 
by pressure changes from the horizontal frac job. 
                                                   
325. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959).  
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The second step would be to determine whether the horizontal 
operator’s frac job was justified despite the vertical operator’s lost use 
value. An invasion is justified in nuisance doctrine when the utility of the 
conduct outweighs the gravity of the resulting harm.326 To determine 
whether the utility of the interfering conduct outweighs the gravity of the 
vertical operator’s loss of reservoir use under this analysis, the court 
would consider the extent of the vertical operator’s inability to produce 
the reservoir. A relatively minor decline in production would weigh in 
favor of finding the horizontal frac job to be reasonable. But a loss of all 
production from a well or the loss of all ability to produce the reservoir 
from a new well would weigh heavily in favor of compensating the 
vertical operator’s loss. 
Applying the Second Restatement, the court would further consider the 
parties’ ability to avoid the harm. It would inquire about such facts as 
whether the horizontal operator could have designed its frac job 
differently without giving up efficiency, whether the vertical operator 
could have reinforced the casing of its vertical well by improving how it 
was cemented in the hole, and whether the vertical operator could have 
pooled its interest with the horizontal operator’s before the horizontal well 
was drilled and completed. The court would also focus on the suitability 
of vertical and horizontal production techniques to the reservoir. If the 
reservoir is unconventional (like the Vicksburg T formation in Garza or 
the tight sand in Stone) horizontal drilling and massive frac operations 
would be necessary to produce the reservoir efficiently. If, on the other 
hand, the reservoir is conventional (e.g., a limestone formation) and 
production in the field is mature and mostly from vertical wells, the 
horizontal frac job would be out of place and less justifiable, especially if 
no horizontal wells have been drilled and proven economic in the field. 
The court would also balance the public’s interest in how the reservoir 
is managed by weighing the social utility of vertical and horizontal 
production. The public’s interest is in the avoidance of waste of 
hydrocarbons, waste of reservoir pressure, and waste from drilling, 
equipping, and producing needless numbers of wells to produce the 
reservoir.327 The horizontal operator could justify its operations by 
showing that horizontal fracking is necessary to recover hydrocarbons 
from the reservoir that would otherwise be left behind by vertical 
production. The vertical operator could improve its case for compensation 
by showing that existing vertical production of the reservoir is sufficient 
                                                   
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1969).  
327. See Christiansen & Pierce, supra note 5, at 11–12 (describing the public’s interest in 
maximizing production and citing the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission’s 2004 Model Oil 
& Gas Conservation Act).  
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to maximize recovery of the hydrocarbons and thus that horizontal drilling 
and completions are needlessly expensive and wasteful. 
If after evaluating these factors the court were to find that horizontal 
fracturing was justified, the vertical operator would have to suffer any lost 
production opportunity without compensation unless it could show that 
the loss is serious or severe.328 The vertical operator’s loss may be serious 
or severe if, for instance, the horizontal completion would render 
impossible or noneconomic production of the reservoir from a vertical 
well anywhere on the vertical operator’s lease. If the loss were shown to 
be serious, the vertical operator may be entitled to compensation, provided 
that the cost of compensation in this and similar cases would not render 
horizontal completions in the reservoir uneconomic. This may be a 
complex question, but it is necessary to avoid an outcome in which the 
most efficient means of production is barred as a practical matter even if 
it is otherwise permitted. 329 If the harm were shown to be severe and such 
that the vertical operator should not have to suffer without compensation, 
the horizontal operator would be absolutely liable under the 
compensation  principle.330 
F. Disputes Arising from CCS and Other Emerging Technologies 
There does not appear to be any reported case involving a subsurface 
invasion from CCS or other emerging techniques like ASR and CAES.331 
As previously discussed, however, the potential for such disputes has 
helped stymie deployment of CCS technology.332 The prevailing 
understanding of subsurface property as possessory and subsurface 
encroachments as trespassory threatens to undermine this and other 
potentially beneficial technology in two broad ways. First, it would 
require a CO2 injector to obtain consent from the pore space owners of 
hundreds or thousands of square miles of property to avoid trespass 
liability from migrating CO2.333 In this scenario the likelihood of holdouts, 
which could prevent the CCS project, is high. Second, the principle of 
absolute liability that flows from the possessory view would practically 
require a CO2 injector to insure against all damage caused by the 
injection.334 Because CO2 injection is likely to interfere with preexisting 
                                                   
328. As those terms are defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826 & 829A, respectively.  
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1969).  
330. Id. § 829A. 
331. For a description of ASR, CAES, and CCS technology, see supra Part I.B.  
332. See supra section I.C.  
333. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
334. While the modern approach to subsurface trespass articulated by Professor Anderson may 
avoid the problem of obtaining unanimous consent, it nonetheless would impose absolute liability on 
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commercial subsurface activities,335 the financial burden of compensating 
for resulting harm may well make CCS operations infeasible. The 
possessory view would similarly undermine any large-scale use of 
subsurface reservoir space for fluid storage, such as ASR or CAES. 
The dual problems of aggregating consent and compensating resulting 
harm without undermining the economic feasibility of CCS would be 
more soluble if the legal system (and all the individual judges, scholars, 
and lawyers who comprise it) understood subsurface property as 
nonpossessory and invasions as nontrespassory. Under a nonpossessory 
view, aggregating the consent of all owners of potentially affected pore 
space would be unnecessary. A reservoir owner would not be entitled to 
exclude injected CO2 merely by virtue of owning an interest in the 
reservoir. Instead, an objecting owner could enjoin the injection operation 
only by showing actual damage to the owner’s right of use and enjoyment 
and that the harm is not justified by injection’s utility.336 The injector in 
such a case may avoid injunction by paying compensation for any harm 
suffered by the objecting owner and thus increasing the injection 
operation’s utility.337 Nuisance doctrine thus replaces the need for consent 
with the option to pay reasonable compensation, thereby compelling the 
participation of holdout landowners. 
Nuisance doctrine also furnishes a compensation scheme superior to 
strict liability. Whereas strict liability for damages resulting from publicly 
beneficial injection operations may render the operations economically 
infeasible, nuisance law contains provisions designed to avoid this result 
in all but the most extreme cases. Only when a landowner’s ability to use 
her property is severely damaged and the damage is greater than the 
landowner “should have to bear without compensation” should a court 
applying nuisance law award compensation without considering the CCS 
operation’s social value or  viability.338 
In cases not involving such severe harm, a landowner’s right to full 
compensation for injury resulting from a socially beneficial CCS 
operation may be subordinated to the operator’s right to continue the 
operation. Harm from CCS operations that is “serious” but not quite 
                                                   
the injector for actual damages from the injection. See Anderson, supra note 31, section III.B.1. Thus, 
even if modified under Professor Anderson’s approach, the possessory view may impede deployment 
of socially valuable technologies.  
335. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
336. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW. INST. 1969).  
337. See id. cmt. e (“In a suit for damages, the legal utility of the activity may also be greatly 
reduced by the fact that the actor is operating the factory and producing the noise and smoke without 
compensating his neighbors for the harm done to them. The conduct for which the utility is being 
weighed includes both the general activity and what is done about its consequences.”).  
338. See id. § 829A; see also Lewin, supra note 111, at 231.  
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“severe” would warrant compensation without regard to the operation’s 
utility, but only if the financial burden of compensating this and similar 
losses would not cause the CCS operation to cease.339 In the absence of 
severe or serious harm an affected landowner would be entitled to 
damages only if, after considering evidence of the character of the locality, 
the character of the harm, and the social value of the parties’ conflicting 
land uses,340 the court finds the gravity of the landowner’s loss outweighs 
the utility of the CCS operation.341 
Viewing subsurface property invasions as nuisances would mean 
resolving them under the same legal framework as nontrespassory 
invasions caused by above-ground waste storage activities. CCS projects 
would be treated much like landfills. When a landfill emits unreasonably 
foul smells into the surrounding neighborhood, for example, the law 
classifies harm done to neighbors’ property a nuisance. The odor particles 
emanating from the landfill may diminish neighbors’ ability to use or 
enjoy their property. It might prevent them from using the land in certain 
ways—perhaps operating a botanical garden—and reduce the value of 
their property for rent or sale. But the stench does not dispossess the 
neighbors of their property or of the airspace above it. When a neighbor 
sues the landfill to abate the odor or recover damages to compensate for 
lost use or enjoyment, the typical court balances the social value of the 
landfill against the gravity of harm from the externality. In so doing the 
court will attempt to efficiently coordinate the parties’ competing uses of 
the semi-common airspace overlying their respective parcels of land. 
CONCLUSION 
If it walks like a nuisance and talks like a nuisance, it might be a 
nuisance. Courts de facto apply nuisance principles in subsurface 
interference cases because nuisance standards are designed to mediate 
competing uses of property to achieve maximally efficient results. In 
contrast, trespass seems inapplicable in situations involving unauthorized 
subsurface encroachments because they do not interfere with exclusivity 
and are not susceptible to a strict scheme of governance. Trespass is not 
                                                   
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1969); see also Lewin, supra 
note 111, at 231. The drafters of the Restatement explain that “[t]he extent of the burden of 
compensating may also affect the determination of what persons can recover. Thus in the case of a 
factory emitting smoke and odors, the granting of compensation for annoyance and inconvenience to 
all persons located in the general vicinity may create a burden so heavy as to make it not feasible to 
continue to operate the factory. Compensation may therefore be granted only to those in close vicinity 
to the plant whose annoyance is more severe, and not to those farther away whose annoyance is less.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. f.  
340. Id. § 827. 
341. See id. § 826(a). 
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the applicable tort regime to enforce incorporeal property interests, and 
thus contains standards inappropriate to that task. 
Evidence that courts treat subsurface interferences as nontrespassory 
appears in the facts courts consider in determining liability. These 
typically include the social and economic value of the defendant’s 
conduct, the commonness of the conduct in the area, and the severity of 
the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Where, as in most cases, the value of 
the defendant’s activity is high, such as where it contributes to the 
prevention waste, and the plaintiff is unable to show actual damages other 
than the value of pore space invaded and occupied, courts tend to find no 
trespass. Yet these factors are not appropriate in determining injury to an 
owner’s possession. They are appropriate, rather, in determining injury to 
the owner’s reasonable use and enjoyment. 
The true nature of the property interest at stake in subsurface 
interference cases is use and enjoyment. It is both logical and doctrinally 
appropriate to apply nuisance, because nuisance is the tort regime 
designed to remedy violations of the use right. Because trespass is the 
wrong standard for remedying infringement of the right to use property, 
applying trespass requires modifying the doctrine in meaningful ways. 
Nuisance principles were developed by courts to mediate conflicting uses 
of adjoining land and, consequently, provide better guidance for courts in 
resolving cases where subsurface activities collide. Nuisance also enables 
a more flexible tailoring of remedies where an unjustified interference is 
found. 
Courts are already engaging in nuisance-like analyses; doing it 
expressly would aid the coherence of their decisions. Improving the 
coherence and predictability of courts’ decision-making in these cases is 
not trivial. Development of commercial-scale CCS facilities, for example, 
requires the right to use hundreds or thousands of square miles of 
subsurface reservoir rights. The risk that offsetting subsurface owners 
may object to use of their pore space for CO2 storage has slowed, and 
currently threatens to paralyze, large-scale deployment of sequestration 
technology. The possibility that courts may apply a strict liability standard 
for any damages that may arise—whether or not such damage should be 
considered legal injury—may inhibit deployment of CCS and other useful 
subterranean technologies. 
 
